$CP · The Intrinsic Value Podcast · 2026-11-15
CP 是一家优秀的企业,拥有不可替代的三国铁路网络,但其 310 亿美元收购 Kansas City Southern 的交易带来了整合阵痛,股份被稀释、稀释后股份增加 37%,ROIC 接近 6.9%,增长尚未得到验证。当前股价接近内在价值,计入股息后的预期年回报仅约 7%,因此说话者选择放弃;若股价跌至 90 美元出头或更低,会更有吸引力。
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Canadian Pacific Kansas City 拥有一条你实实在在看得见的护城河。20,000 米的钢铁,几乎无人能够复制。而且它是唯一一条用单线连接加拿大、美国和墨西哥的铁路。
但在经历了十年的两位数复合增长之后,它进行了一笔 310 亿美元的收购。自那以后,股东们大多只能在道口等待。
Canadian Pacific Kansas City has a moat you can actually see. 20,000 m of steel that almost nobody can replicate. And it's the only railroad that connects Canada, the US, and Mexico in a single line.
But after a decade of double-digit compounding, it made a $31 billion acquisition. And since then, shareholders have mostly been left waiting at the crossing.
那么,Canadian Pacific Kansas City 是一家即将重新点燃复利引擎的伟大企业,还是一家价格不对的伟大企业?让我们一探究竟。
So, is Canadian Pacific Kansas City a great business about to reignite the compounding engine? Or is it just a great business at the wrong price? Let's find out.
有趣的是,我之所以对 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 感兴趣,部分原因其实是又一次怀旧。
And funny enough, part of the reason that I'm actually interested in Canadian Pacific, Kansas City was another bout of nostalgia.
所以在那段时期之前,它是 Canadian Pacific Railway Line。而这座城市最初如何得到这条绿道的故事,本身其实就挺有意思。火车停运之后,这条线路基本上就空置了很多年。
邻居们最终在整条轨道上种起了社区花园。于是 2014 年,Canadian Pacific 决定要就那块土地获得补偿。于是它派出人员清理那些花园,以表明它仍然有权在那里运行火车,尽管它并没有。
后来,在 CP 与温哥华市之间又经过几年非常公开的来回交涉之后,温哥华市最终以约 5500 万美元买下了这条走廊。所以,即便是一条他们根本没在使用、位于市中心、当地并不满意的线路,Canadian Pacific 依然坚守立场,最终还从这项资产上赚了一点钱。我认为这就是拥有别人无法触及的土地的力量。
So before that period, it was the Canadian Pacific Railway Line. And the story of how the city got this greenway in the first place is actually kind of a cool story on its own.
So after the train stopped running, the line basically just sat there empty for many years. Neighbors ended up planting community gardens all over the tracks. So in 2014, Canadian Pacific decided that it wanted to get paid for that land.
So it sent crews to clear out those gardens to show that it still had the right to run trains there, even though it didn't. Now, after a few more years of very public back and forth between CP and the city of Vancouver, the city of Vancouver ended up buying the corridor for about $55 million.
So, even on a line that they weren't even using in the middle of the city that just wasn't happy with it, Canadian Pacific held its ground and still ended up making a little bit of money on that uh asset.
I think that's kind of the power of owning land that nobody else can touch.
如果你在本期节目调研之前问我怎么看待这些铁路公司,我可能倾向于把它归入完全相同的一类。但 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 在合并前交出了相当出色的数字。
真正令人瞩目的是大约从 2012 年到 2020 年股东回报的增长。每股收益增长 26%,同期股价上涨约 20%,外加 1% 的股息。真的非常非常好。当时的数字看起来确实很好,但如果你看看过去五年左右的数字,它们就比你想看到的更像 BNSF 了。
每股收益明显放缓至中个位数增长,而股价相应地仅以 5.5% 复合增长。所以,虽然我会说,呃,Canadian Pacific Kansas City 和 BNSF 都拥有显著的护城河,但两者看起来都不像是非常值得买入的标的。
And if you'd asked me what I thought about the Kay railroads before researching for this episode, I probably would have leaned towards putting it in the exact same bucket. But Canadian Pacific Kansas City before co was putting up some exceptional numbers.
So the real head turner was the growth in shareholder returns from about 2012 until 2020. 26% growth in EPS while the share price grew about 20% plus a 1% dividend. Really, really good stuff.
The numbers then looked really good, but if you take a look at the numbers over the last 5 years or so, they're a lot more BNSF like than you'd want to see. Earnings per share has slowed considerably into mid-s singledigit growth while the share price has compounded at just 5. 5% correspondingly.
And so while I would say uh Canadian Pacific Kansas City and BNSF both have significant moes, neither of them have really seemed to look like screaming buys.
对,我认为如果你脱离背景看那些数字,我完全同意。坦白说,它们并不那么好看。但 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 一直处于一场非常大规模的重组之中。它直到 2023 年才收购 Kansas City Southern,那是一笔约 310 亿美元的非常大的收购。
现在,由于这笔大收购,出现了一些非常非常大的、我想你可以说是整合阵痛,而且我并不真的认为这些阵痛已经结束,这就是为什么增长看起来不太好。
Yeah, I think if you look at those numbers without context, I completely agree. They aren't that pretty, frankly. But Canadian Pacific Kansas City has been part of a very large restructuring.
So it only bought Kansas City Southern back in 2023 and it was a very large acquisition at about $31 billion. Now, because of the large acquisition, there have been some very, very large, I guess you could say, integration pains, and I don't really think that they're over yet, which is why the growth hasn't looked very good.
但合并后业务的纯粹规模确实很难与之竞争。它是第一条也是唯一一条穿越北美三个不同国家的铁路。所以从战略上讲,它确实是一件杰作。目前没有其他铁路公司能够复制它们拥有的网络。
But the pure scale of the combined business is really quite hard to compete with. It's the first and only railroad to run through three different countries in North America. So, strategically, it's really a masterpiece.
No other railroad currently can replicate the network that they have.
但这笔交易还在资产负债表上增加了大量债务、新股以及商誉。仅为了给这笔交易融资,稀释后的股份数量就增加了 37%。所以,你知道,虽然业务规模大了很多,但每股业绩肯定远不如之前那十年那么令人兴奋。
But the deal also added a large amount of debt, new shares, as well as goodwill onto the balance sheet. And the diluted share count increased by 37% just to fund the deal. So, you know, while the business is much bigger, the per share results have definitely been a lot less exciting than the decade that came before it.
那是一种相当痛苦的错觉,我能看出它如何影响了每股收益。这些都是需要考虑的重要因素,因为如果你预期业务会重新回升到历史增速,那可能一切就说得通,但真的如果不是这样,那这家公司就变得没那么有意思了。
That is uh some pretty painful delusion and and I can see how that has affected its per share earnings. And these are important things to account for because if you expect the business to pick up again toward historical rates and it might all make sense but really if not then this business just becomes a whole lot less interesting.
对,完全同意。我只是想让大家感受一下 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的规模。它非常非常庞大。所以 2025 年他们的营收超过 150 亿美元。他们拥有大约 20,000 英里的轨道,这足够从多伦多到墨西哥城往返 10 次。
Yeah, totally. And I just want to give everyone a sense of Canadian Pacific Kansas City scale here. So it's very very massive. So in 2025 they did over $15 billion in revenue. They have roughly $20,000 miles of track and that's enough track to get from Toronto to Mexico City and back 10 different times.
而我们有一家伟大的企业,它也许开始有点落后了,这就是我的看法。这是整个故事中我最喜欢的部分之一,因为 Canadian Pacific 不仅仅是一条铁路。它实际上是加拿大以今天这种形态存在的一个重大原因。
所以我们必须追溯到 1871 年,当时我的家乡省份不列颠哥伦比亚同意加入加拿大。但为了加入,它有一个非常非常大的条件。联邦政府必须修建一条连接 BC 与全国其他地区的铁路。没有那条铁路,BC 基本上就是一个被数千公里草原和落基山脉包围的巨大孤岛。
于是 1881 年,Canadian Pacific Railway 成立,以修建那条铁路。当时的截止期限还很远,大约在 10 年之后,但他们实际上只用了分配给他们的时间的一半就完成了。
最后一颗道钉于 1885 年钉入。所以,当我说 BC 是因为铁路才加入加拿大时,我真的没有夸张。
And we have a great business that is maybe starting to lag a bit here is how I would think about it. And this is one of my favorite parts of the story simply because Canadian Pacific isn't just a railroad.
It's really a big reason that Canada exists in the shape that it is today. So, we have to go all the way back to 1871 when my home province, British Columbia, agreed to join Canada.
But in order to do so, it had one very, very large condition. The federal government had to build a railroad that connected BC to the rest of the country. And without that railroad, BC was basically a giant island surrounded by thousands of kilometers of prairie and Rocky Mountains.
So, in 1881, the Canadian Pacific Railway was formed to build that railway out. Now, the deadline was a long way out at about 10 years or so later, but they actually ended up finishing it in only half the time that was allotted to them.
And the last spike was driven in 1885. So, when I say BC joined Canada because of the railroad, I'm really not exaggerating.
所以从那时起,Canadian Pacific 发展成了一家完整的综合企业集团,这么说有点奇怪。它拥有酒店、远洋轮船之类的东西,有一家叫 CPA 的航空公司,甚至涉足能源和采矿业务。
它几乎就像是加拿大的伯克希尔·哈撒韦。但在 2001 年,它最终拆分成五家独立的上市公司,铁路则基本上被留作一个独立实体。
So, from this point on, Canadian Pacific grew into a full-blown conglomerate, which is kind of a weird thing to say. It owned things like hotels, ocean ships, it had an airliner called CPA and even had a hand in energy and mining businesses.
It was almost like a Berkshire Hathway of Canada. But in 2001, it ended up splitting into five separate public companies and the railroad was kind of left as this standalone entity.
在那次拆分之后的约十年里,坦白说 Canadian Pacific 表现相当平庸。铁路行业使用的一个关键指标叫运营比率。它是运营支出占收入的百分比。你基本上可以把它理解为营业利润率的倒数。
所以如果你的运营支出占 60%,那就意味着你的营业利润率是 40%。在这段时间里,CP 拥有全行业最低的运营比率之一。
Now, for about a decade after that split, Canadian Pacific was honestly pretty mediocre. So, one of the KPIs used in the railroad industry is called the operating ratio. It's the percentage of revenue spent on operating expenses.
You could basically think of it as the inverse of operating margins. So if your operating expenses are 60%, then that means that your operating margin would be 40%. During this time, CP had one of the lowest operating ratios in the entire industry.
而这为加拿大历史上最著名的维权投资者行动之一奠定了基础。所以在2011年,Bill Aman察觉到Canadian Pacific周围似乎有可乘之机,他喜欢这门生意,但他也明确认识到,这家公司需要有人推它一把、把它引向正确的方向。
于是他建立了这家公司的持股,并决定由自己来推这一把。投资逻辑很简单:Canadian Pacific本来就拥有很好的铁路网络,只是运营得极其糟糕。正如其运营比率所显示的,他这一点判断是对的。
当时Canadian Pacific的运营比率为80%,这简直糟透了。
And this helped set the stage for one of the most famous activist campaigns in all of Canada's history. So in 2011, Bill Aman sensed that there was some blood in the water for Canadian Pacific and he liked the business, but he definitely understood that it needed a push in the right direction.
So he built a stake in the business and he decided that he would be the one to push it. The thesis was pretty simple. Canadian Pacific had a great network already, but it was just being run very, very poorly.
And as the operating ratio suggests, he was right on that part. So at this time, Canadian Pacific had an operating ratio of 80%, which is just plain bad.
于是他把铁路货运行业变得有点像航空业,对吧?就是运行更少、更长的列车,砍掉闲置的机车和车厢,减少在编组场里停留的时间。他的这套体系效果惊人。Canadian Pacific的营业利润率从百分之十几一路升到超过40%,同期股价以每年超过17%的速度复合增长。
And so he turned the rail shipping industry into something more like an airline, right? Where where you run fewer longer trains and you cut out the idle locomotives and rail cars and you reduce the amount of time spent sitting in rail yards.
And his system worked like crazy. uh Canadian Pacific's operating margins went from the mid- teens all the way up to over 40% and the stock price compounded at over 17% a year during that same period.
再回到Bill Aman那部分,这笔投资最终非常非常成功,从Sean刚才提到的回报你大概也能看出来。据报道,他在大约5年时间里赚了约26.6亿美元利润。所以,他这一注押得确实很准。
不过,我认为Hunter Harrison当时的举措对CP来说非常非常具有变革性。基本上任何一家企业能实现那样快速的利润率扩张,都非常非常了不起。通常你预期会在高速扩张的企业里看到这种情况,而不是在一家乏味的铁路公司。
And just to get back to that part on Bill Aman, it ended up being a very very successful investment as you could probably tell from the uh returns that Sean just said. So he reportedly made about 2. 6 6 billion in profits over the course of about 5 years.
So, you know, he really nailed this bet. But yeah, I think Hunter Harrison's moves were very very transformative for CP at this time. For basically any business to go through a rapid margin expansion like that is very very impressive.
Usually, you'd expect to see this in a scaling business, not a boring railroad.
所以,Harrison离开后,他的得力助手Keith Creel接手,Creel至今仍是CEO。还有个有趣的事实:Creel在来到CP之前,也曾在Canadian National的Harrison手下工作。
所以,有两位前Canadian National的高管过来,把Canadian Pacific做得比Canadian National Railroad还要好。
So, after Harrison left, his right-hand man, Keith Creel, ended up taking over, and Creel remains the CEO today. And here's a fun fact. Creel also worked under Harrison at Canadian National before coming over to CP.
So, you've got two former Canadian National executives who came over and made Canadian Pacific even better than Canadian National Railroad.
所以,这对一家科技型企业来说确实说得通。但Canadian Pacific仅仅通过改变发车频率就做到了这一点,这就更令人印象深刻了。
And so really that can make sense for a techbased business. But it's even more impressive that Canadian Pacific was able to do this just by changing the frequency of their departure.
那么,如果我们想想这些,再回到当下,我有一个问题是:Canadian Pacific Kansas City今天在结构上究竟是什么样子,以及它到底赚多少钱?
So if we uh we think about that and we get back to the present day, one question I have is what does Canadian Pacific Kansas City actually look like today in terms of its structure and then how much money does it make?
对吧?我认为它的商业模式核心其实非常简单。Canadian Pacific Kansas City拥有这张庞大的铁路网络,客户基本上必须付钱给它,才能把货物从一地运到另一地。真的就是这么回事。
他们根据运多少货、运多远以及运的是什么货来收费。
Right? So I think at its core the business model is really very simple. So Canadian Pacific Kansas City owns this vast network of track and customers basically have to pay it to move their freight from one point to another.
I mean that's really it. So they charge based on how much freight they're hauling, how far it's going, and then on what kind of freight it is.
所以,正如我提到的,这张网络现在有20,000英里,简直大得不可思议。它从温哥华港出发,向东穿过大草原,一直到蒙特利尔和大西洋沿岸的圣约翰。然后向南穿过美国中西部,南下到堪萨斯城,再一路穿过得克萨斯州,在拉雷多跨越美墨边境。
进入墨西哥后,通往该国的工业心脏地带,然后分岔通往太平洋沿岸和墨西哥湾沿岸。
So the network, like I mentioned, now runs 20,000 miles. It's just incredibly incredibly vast. So it goes from the port of Vancouver, east across the prairies to Montreal and St. John on the Atlantic coast.
Then it goes south through the US Midwest down to Kansas City and then all the way through Texas across the US Mexico border at Laredo. And then inside Mexico goes to the industrial heart of the country before splitting off to both the Pacific and the Gulf Coasts.
按收入来看,他们的多元化程度非常好。48%来自加拿大,24%来自美国,约18%来自墨西哥。那么下一个问题是:他们在运什么?大致可以分为三大类。第一类是散货,约占货运收入的40%,包括粮食、钾碱和化肥等。
然后是杂货,又占40%,包括能源和化学品、林产品、金属、矿物以及汽车相关货物。最后是多式联运,约占20%,就是你看到在列车上可能堆得过高的那些集装箱,通常装满了消费品。
Now by revenue they have very good diversification. 48% of it comes from Canada, 24 from the US and about 18% from Mexico. So the next question is what are they moving? It can kind of be broken down into three major buckets.
The first is bulk which makes up about 40% of freight revenue. This includes items such as grain, pot ash, and fertilizers. Then you have merchandise which is another 40%. This makes up things like energy and chemicals, forest products, metals, minerals, and automotive.
And then lastly, you have inner modal, which accounts for about 20%. That's, you know, the shipping containers that you see stacked maybe too high on trains, which are typically full of consumer goods.
所以,它的业务组合比我们最近看过的很多公司都要均衡。Reddit就是一个例子,它基本上只有广告这一条收入线。即便是我们最近看过的GE Aerospace这样的公司,也完全取决于商用发动机需求而大起大落。
So, it's a more balanced mix than a lot of the companies that we've actually looked at lately. Reddit being uh one that comes to mind where you basically have one revenue line for advertising.
And even with a company like GE Aerospace that we looked at recently, um it rises and falls tremendously just based solely on commercial engine demand.
而Canadian Pacific Kansas City则横跨三个国家,还分布在三个不同的货运类别上。所以,某一种大宗商品或某一个经济体表现疲弱的一年,会被其他部分缓冲掉,这很大程度上解释了为什么这个行业能挺过两个世纪的商业周期,以及为什么它至少近几十年来能够保持相当稳定的向右上方增长。
Whereas with Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, it's spread across three countries and then three different freight buckets. So, a weak year in one commodity or one economy does get cushioned by the others, which goes a long way toward explaining how this industry has survived two centuries of business cycles and how it's been able to to have a pretty steady growth up and to the right, at least in in recent decades.
我相信粮食是他们今天业务中相当大的一块。我的意思是,考虑到他们穿过的所有大草原,这必然是他们最大的客户之一,想想还有点奇怪,因为作为终端消费者,你确实不太会去想粮食进入了多少种不同的食品。
但从面包到早餐麦片、饼干、Goldfish饼干、意面、面条、啤酒,还有多得多的东西。我们现代的生活方式在很大程度上确实靠粮食运转。
And I believe grain is a pretty big piece of the business that they do today. I mean, I would imagine with all the prairies they go through, it has to be one of their biggest customers, which is sort of weird to think about because as an end customer, you really don't think a lot about how many different food items that grain goes into.
But everything from bread to breakfast cereals to crackers, goldfish, pasta, noodles, and beer, and and a whole lot more. Uh really our modern lifestyles run hugely on grain.
是的,再想想的话,这非常合理。不过,这也是我过去没怎么想过的事情。通常我想到粮食,就只想到面包,仅此而已。但你说得对。粮食是他们最大的单一业务线,占其货运收入远超20%。
Yeah, it makes a lot of sense when you think more about it. But, you know, it's also something that I haven't given too much thought to in the past. So, usually when I think of grains, I think of bread and that's about it.
But you are correct. Grain is their single largest business line, making up well over 20% of its freight revenue.
铁路公司用一种叫收入吨英里(RTM)的指标来衡量运量,字面意思就是一吨货物运送一英里。所以,在2026年第二季度,收入吨英里增长了约4%,总收入增长了13%,达到约42亿美元。
Now, railroads measured their volume in something called revenue ton miles or RTMs, which is literally just one ton of freight moved just one mile. So, in Q2 of 2026, revenue ton miles were up about 4% and total revenue was up 13% to about 4.2 billion.
所以这门生意运了很多货。运量增长了4%,但收入实际上增长了13%。这个差距相当大。这仅仅是因为定价能力,还是说存在某种经营杠杆,或者我漏掉了什么?
So this business is moving a lot of freight. >> So volumes were up 4%. But then they actually had revenue rise 13%. So that that's a pretty big gap. Is that down to just pricing power or um is there some sort of operating leverage there or what am I what am I missing?
是的,Sean,你抓得很准。虽然要是能说这全是定价能力就好了,但遗憾的是那并不正确。我认为这个差距很大一部分来自燃油附加费之类的东西。当燃油价格上涨时——我相信大家都很清楚现在正在发生——铁路公司往往会通过所谓的附加费把这项成本转嫁给客户。
所以在第二季度,燃油附加费收入增长了令人瞠目的74%,为收入增加了约2.58亿美元。
Yeah, good catch there, Sean. And while it would be wonderful to say that it's all pricing power, that would unfortunately be incorrect. So I think a lot of that gap comes from things like fuel search charges.
So when fuel prices go up, which I'm sure everyone is very well aware of is happening right now, railroads tend to pass that cost on to their customers through something called a search charge.
So in Q2, the fuel searchcharge revenue increased by a mind-boggling 74% adding roughly $258 million to revenue.
这是一大笔钱,而且完全不是经营性的。所以,虽然Canadian Pacific Kansas City能把这笔费用向客户收取、而不必自己吸收是好事,但它同时也是一项完全周期性、不受他们掌控的收入来源。
所以,是的,它起到了保护利润率的杠杆作用。但关键是不要把它误认为有机增长。如果剔除燃油和创纪录的粮食丰收,基础收入增长落在中个位数,这更接近我刚才提到的收入吨英里数字。
Now, that's a lot of money that isn't operational in any way. So while it's great that Canadian Pacific Kansas City can charge this to its customers rather than have to absorb it itself, it's also a revenue generator that is entirely cyclical and out of their hands.
So yes, it acts as a lever to help protect its margins. But it's crucial not to confuse this for organic growth. So if you strip out the fuel and the record grain harvest, underlying revenue growth comes in the mid- single digits, which is kind of closer to that revenue ton mile figure that we I just discussed.
是的。如果我们在这里打个比方,就好比一家早餐店吹嘘销售额更高,而它实际上只是把价格直接按投入成本的上涨幅度提高了。鸡蛋成本涨了,他们就把这些成本直接转嫁给消费者。所以你实际上并没有卖出更多的煎蛋卷和班尼迪克蛋,也没有创造新的利润率。
你只是对同样也让你成本更高的同样的食物收更多的钱,这并没有真正的净收益。正是如此。而如果你看Canadian Pacific Kansas City,你必须把这两者分开。显然,公司报告的是头条数字,也就是那个更大的数字。
所以它总会包含那笔燃油附加费。所以在对头条数字过于兴奋之前,一定要把这一点考虑进去。
>> Yeah. Now, if we were going to maybe use an analogy here, it would be sort of like a breakfast restaurant bragging about having higher sales when all they really did was just raise prices directly correlating to the rise in their input cost.
So, cost of their eggs went up and then they pass those costs directly onto the consumer. So, you aren't actually selling more omelettes and egg benedicts or or making new margins. you're just charging more for the same food that also costs you more and there's not really a net benefit to it >> precisely.
And if you're looking at Canadian Pacific Kansas City, you have to separate those two. So obviously business reports the headline numbers which is the larger number. So it's always going to include that fuel search charge.
So just make sure to take that into account before getting overly excited about headline numbers.
但这个商业模式还有另一个非常被低估的部分。既然我们有巨型卡车,能做几乎完全相同的事,而且不受只能在两条轨道上行驶的限制,那为什么还要费劲用火车呢?答案是,按每吨英里计算,铁路的燃油效率大约是卡车运输的3到4倍。
此外,一列火车可以让数百辆卡车从公路上消失。所以对于像超重货物长途运输这类事情,比如也许是从萨斯喀彻温省运到温哥华港的钾肥,铁路基本上每次都会胜出。
But there's another part of this business model that is very underappreciated. So why bother using trains when we have giant trucks that can do essentially the exact same thing but aren't constrained by going on two tracks?
So the answer is that rail is roughly 3 to four times more fuel efficient per ton mile than trucking. Additionally, one train can take hundreds of trucks off of the road. So for things like long hauls of very heavy stuff like maybe pod dash going from Saskatchewan to the port of Vancouver, rail wins basically every single time.
我上大学的时候,看着这些火车,感觉它们可能要花整整五分钟才能通过。所以我猜它们相当长。是的。加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城铁路的平均列车长度大约是9,000到300英尺,也就是大约1.75英里。
所以如果你被一列火车堵在后面,我建议你带上一两份零食,最好再找一个好的播客,也许能听上几个小时。
So, uh, back in college for me, I would look at these trains and it would feel like they would take maybe five full minutes to pass. So, I I'm guessing that they're quite long.
>> Yeah. Well, the average Canadian Pacific Kansas City train is about 9,000 to 300 ft long. So, that's about a mile and 3/4. So, if you're stuck behind one, I'd recommend bringing a snack or two and probably finding a good podcast, maybe hours to listen to.
这绝对是我非常熟悉的一种感受。简单来说,看核心业务的话,你拥有轨道,可以按严格的时间表运行这些高效的长编组列车,并向客户收取运输这些货物的费用,对吧?这大概是你理解它最简单的方式。
当然,你能实现的运输密度或列车运行频率越高,这项业务的盈利能力就会显著提升。
>> Well, so it's uh it's definitely a feeling I I know pretty well. And uh when we look at the core business in a nutshell, you own the track and you can run these long efficient trains on a strict schedule and you charge customers for transporting that stuff, right?
That's uh probably the the simplest way that you could think about it. And of course, the profitability of the business increases significantly the greater traffic density or frequency of train movements you can have.
但我们不妨转到业务中一个实际上给加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城的业绩带来麻烦的部分,也就是他们对堪萨斯城南方铁路的收购。
But how about we transition here to a part of the business that has really actually thrown a wrench into Canadian Pacific Kansas City's numbers, which was their acquisition of Kansas City Southern.
是的。我认为故事真正有趣的地方就在这里。2021年3月,加拿大太平洋宣布收购堪萨斯城南方铁路,这是一家美国铁路公司,在美国以及墨西哥东北部都拥有铁路。堪萨斯城南方是美国大型铁路公司中最小的一家。
但它也拥有其他铁路公司都没有的东西,那就是直通墨西哥工业中心的这条线路。此外,它还拥有得克萨斯州拉雷多的国际铁路桥,我们前面简要提到过。补充一下背景,拉雷多是美墨之间最繁忙的贸易过境路线。
Yeah. So, I think this is where the story gets really interesting. So, back in March of 2021, Canadian Pacific announced that it was buying Kansas City Southern, a US railroad that owned a railroad in the US as well as northeastern Mexico.
So, Kansas City Southern was the smallest of the big US railroads. But it also had access to something that no other railroad had, which was this direct line into Mexico's industrial hub.
Plus, it had ownership of the international rail bridge at Loro, Texas, which we briefly discussed here earlier. So, just for context, Loro is the busiest trade crossing route between the US and Mexico.
我一开始的问题是,这次合并为什么以及怎么会说得通?但当你看到合并后形成的网络地图时,我认为答案就相当明显了。在交易之前,如果你想通过铁路把货物从墨西哥运到加拿大,需要两三家不同的铁路公司,在每个边境都要交接。
而交接的问题在于,它会增加延误和成本,也会增加货运出问题的风险。现在对加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城来说,他们可以用一条线路从墨西哥经美国运到加拿大。这意味着这项业务只依赖一家铁路公司、一张账单,而且实际上只有一个责任方来统筹一切。
And the question I had going in was, you know, why and how did this merger even make sense? But when you look at the the network map that is formed together after the merger, I think it makes it pretty obvious.
And so before the deal, if you wanted to move goods from Mexico to Canada by rail, it needed two or three different railroads with handoffs at at each border. And so the problem with handoffs is they add delays and costs and more risk of something going wrong with the shipment.
And now for Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, they can do it on a single line from Mexico through the US and into Canada. And so that means the business relies on one railroad, one bill, and and really one point of accountability to to bring everything together.
是的,这是一个非常大的卖点,你也能看出这就是他们做这笔收购的原因。这有点像一架飞机把你直接送到目的地,而不是要转好几次航班。今年早些时候,我有机会搭直飞航班去伦敦。相比要转很多次航班、不断换飞机,我更喜欢直飞。
转机还有风险,比如我的航班延误,或者行李被送到完全不同的国家。
>> Yeah, it's a really big selling point, which is you can see is why they did this acquisition. It's kind of like one airplane taking you all the way to your destination instead of just taking multiple flights.
So earlier this year, I got a chance to take a direct flight to London. And I much prefer that over taking many, many different flights where I have to continue switching to new airplanes.
Switching also risks things like delays to my flight or having my luggage arrive in a completely different country.
但我们来深入看看铁路行业里让我真正感兴趣的一个方面。我想了解铁路的部分原因,是读到了一篇很好的文章,讲的是 Chris Hone 对所谓“不可替代的实物资产”的青睐。你可以把这些资产理解为由于土地权、许可等因素而无法被替代的资产,甚至仅仅是因为要尝试与现有基础设施竞争,就需要投入数十亿美元资本。
这正是 Chris Han 的方法中让我觉得非常有说服力的部分。他并不是在外面寻找便宜的 AI 押注或颠覆性技术。我的意思是,他基本上采取了相反的做法,问自己:今天有什么东西是几乎不可能以任何价格重建的?
我认为铁路显然是这种情况的一个很好的例子,这也是为什么他的基金同时持有加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城和加拿大国家铁路。
But let's dig into one area of railroads in general that got me really interested. So part of why I wanted to learn about railroads was from reading a great article on Chris Hone's attraction to these things called irreplaceable physical assets.
And you can think of these as basically assets that can't be replaced due to factors such as land rights, permitting, or even simply the billions of dollars in capital that would be required to even attempt to compete with existing infrastructure.
And that's the part of of Chris Han's approach that I I find really compelling. He he isn't out there looking for cheap AI bets or disruptive technology. I mean, he basically took the opposite approach, asking himself what would be nearly impossible to rebuild today at any price.
And I think a railroad is clearly a good example of this exact situation, which is why he owns both uh Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, and Canadian National in his fund.
但我想对加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城作为某种“收费站”业务的这一优势提出一点反驳。几乎没有人能出去新建一条铁路,这一事实并不意味着加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城就可以随意收取任何价格。这并没有赋予他们无限的定价权。
But I want to give you a little push back on this advantage that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has as kind of a toll booth business. And so the fact that pretty much nobody can go out and build a new railroad doesn't mean that Canadian Pacific Kansas City can go out there and just charge whatever price they want to. It doesn't give them unlimited pricing power.
那么从你的角度看,你认为加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城真正的优势来自哪里?
So from your perspective where where do you think the real advantages come from for Canadian Pacific Kansas City?
是的,我认为这是一个很好的观点,你说得很到位。虽然铁路因其持久的生命力而是很好的资产,但它们并不总是最好的投资。所以,如果你告诉我一个潜在投资每年只增长3%,我连10秒钟都不会花在它上面,因为它远低于我的门槛收益率,花时间在它上面完全是浪费。
但我认为在加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城的案例中,他们还有不少其他优势。
>> Yeah, I think that's a great point and you really nailed it. So while railroads are great assets because of their kind of lasting power, they aren't always the best investments.
So, if you told me about a potential investment that was going to grow at just 3% per year, I wouldn't even bother spending 10 seconds on it because it's just so far below my hurdle rate that spending time on it would be a complete waste.
But I think in Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's case, they have quite a few other strengths.
在我看来,他们最大的竞争优势是铁路作为一种稀缺资源。过去一个世纪左右,美国实际上没有人出去新建一条大型铁路。如果你想尝试与加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城的网络竞争,想象一下那会有多头疼。
你首先需要在三个不同的国家购买连片的土地,而这三个国家目前彼此之间在某种程度上都存在矛盾。把这件事办成看起来几乎完全不可能。但即使你做到了,在开始产生一丝收入之前,你还需要数百亿美元。
加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城的资产负债表上承载着超过570亿美元的财产价值,以及约220亿美元的商誉和无形资产。
So, in my view, their biggest competitive advantage is the railroads as a scarce resource. So, nobody has really gone out and built a new major railroad in America in the last century or so.
And if you wanted to even try to compete with Can Pacific Kansas City's network, just imagine how big of a headache that would be. You'd first need to buy contiguous strips of land in three different countries, all of which are currently at odds with each other to some degree.
And getting that done just seems completely next to impossible. But if you did that, you'd also need tens of billions of dollars before you even started generating a scent of revenue.
So, Canadian Pacific Kansas City carries over $57 billion in property value on their balance sheet as well as about $22 billion in goodwill and intangible assets.
这570亿美元是个非常有意思的数字。如果你认为这就是替换或复制他们所建资产所需的成本,那你实际上会大大低估真实数字。加拿大太平洋原有业务对其铁路的估值约为每英里200万美元。如今的实际价格大概率应该在每英里800万到2000万美元的区间。
所以当你把其他组成部分加进去,比如铁路编组场、终端、隧道和桥梁等主要结构、路权土地,以及铁路车辆本身,那么估算的重置成本大概率在2500亿到5000亿美元之间。
And that $57 billion is a very interesting number. So, if you think that's what it would cost to replace or replicate what they have built, you'd actually be underestimating the real number by quite a long shot.
So, the legacy Canadian Pacific business values its railroads at about $2 million per mile. The actual price today should probably go in a range more like between eight and 20 million per mile.
So when you add the other components like rail yards, terminals, major structures like tunnels and bridges, rightway land, as well as the rail cars themselves, well then the estimated replacement cost is probably somewhere between 250 billion to $500 billion.
这就是那种你不需要坐下来做表格就能理解为什么竞争对手如此困难的模式。我的意思是,如果你明天要创办一家铁路公司,你根本不会有胜算。我只能想象,要在我希望居住的地方附近获得一条新铁路线的许可会有多难。这还没把资本成本考虑进去。
>> It's just one of those modes where you don't need to sit down in a spreadsheet to to grasp why it's so hard for a competitor. I mean, if you were to start a railroad business tomorrow, you wouldn't stand a chance.
And so, I can only imagine how difficult it would be to get a permit to run a new train line anywhere close to where I want to live. And that's not even taking into consideration the capital cost, too.
完全正确。我住的温哥华也是一样。光是拿到建一栋双拼住宅的许可,就要等很久。不过新建一条铁路,我的意思是,我见证加人队连续三次赢得斯坦利杯的概率还更大些。而在加拿大,为了让这一优势更强大,铁路是加拿大太平洋堪萨斯城和加拿大国家铁路之间的双寡头格局。
>> Exactly. And that's the exact same thing that I would have where I live as well in Vancouver. Just to get a permit to build a duplex, you know, home takes forever. A new railroad, though, I mean, I'd have a better chance of watching the Canucks win three straight Stanley Cups in a row.
Well, to make the advantage even more powerful in Canada, the railroads are a duopoly between Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, and Canadian National.
所以在他们经营的每一个地区,他们要么处于双寡头格局,要么处于非常紧密的寡头格局。而这种结构正是我们倾向于这类企业的重要原因。当市场上只有少数几个理性的参与者时,没有人有太大动力去发动价格战。
因此定价往往会随着时间推移逐步上行,资本回报率也会相应改善。
So in each geography that they operate in, they are either a duopoly or a very tight oligopoly. And that structure is a big part of why we have gravitated toward these businesses.
When there are only a handful of rational players in the market, nobody has much of an incentive to start a price war. And so pricing tends to drift upward over time and returns on capital tend to improve accordingly.
所以,我认为你刚才提到的这种结构最有趣的地方在于,在加拿大、美国和墨西哥这三个国家里,都只有一家铁路运营商。我认为这本身就是巨大的优势。而且即便在现有的这张网络内部,也有几项资产同样不可替代。比如我们之前提到的拉雷多桥,
So, I think the super interesting part about this structure that you just mentioned is that there's only one railroad operator in all three of these countries, Canada, US, and Mexico.
And I think that's on its own a tremendous advantage. And even inside of that existing network, there are a couple of assets that are also irreplaceable. So the Laredo Bridge, which we mentioned earlier,
所以我认为,Canadian Pacific Kansas City 相对于其他铁路公司的优势相当强。但正如我们今天稍微提到过的,就货运而言,铁路并不是把货物从A点运到B点的唯一工具。
这有点像播客的竞争对手并不只是其他播客,而是所有形式的娱乐。对铁路来说,它们的竞争对手也不只是其他铁路线路,而是任何能运输货物的方式,其中也包括卡车和飞机。
So I think the advantages that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has against other railroads are are pretty strong. But as we've kind of touched on a bit today, when it comes to freight, rail is not the only vehicle used to move things from point A to point B.
It's sort of like how a podcast or only competition isn't only other podcasts. It's all forms of entertainment for trains. Their competition isn't just other railroad lines, but anything that can move goods, and that's also trucks and airplanes.
不过我要说,空运相比铁路实在太贵了,它可能实际上根本算不上竞争对手。所以要把货物运到海外,那当然不是 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 从事的业务。但让你大致了解一下空运每吨的成本:大约是5000美元,而铁路货运每吨大约只要50美元。
所以我认为,在这里真正值得担心的另一个竞争对手其实只有卡车。
I will say though that air freight is just so expensive compared to rail that it probably doesn't even actually belong as a competitor. So to ship things overseas, sure that's not a business that Canadian Pacific Kansas City is in.
But just to give you an idea of how much air freight costs per ton. So it's about $5,000 and that compares to roughly $50 per ton by rail freight. So trucks are really the only other competitor that I think is probably worth worrying about here.
所以我们刚才讨论的护城河确实保护了 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的生存,但由于运输货物有多种不同方式,它并没有真正保护其定价权。所以在较短的路线上,卡车会更快,也灵活得多。
So the moat that we just discussed definitely protects Canadian Pacific Kansas City's existence, but because there are different ways to move freight, it doesn't really protect its pricing power.
So on things like shorter routes, then trucks are going to be faster and much more flexible.
所以,我想我会把 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的客户大致分成这两类。第一类是受制于人的托运商。你可以想象萨斯喀彻温省的一座钾肥矿,或者阿尔伯塔省的一座谷物提升机,就坐落在 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的铁轨之上,附近没有其他铁路。
那么,如果这家客户要把货物深入运往美国,它真的没有别的选择。Canadian Pacific Kansas City 几乎就是它能使用的唯一选择。
So you know, I guess I'd split Canadian Pacific Kansas City's customers into kind of these two groups. First, you have captive shippers. You know, if you picture a podash mine in Saskatchewan or maybe a grain elevator in Alberta sitting right on top of a Canadian Pacific, Kansas City railroad track with no other railroad nearby.
Well, that customer really has no alternative if they're shipping deep into the US. Canadian Pacific Kansas City would be pretty much the only option that they can use to ship.
第二类则是有一定选择余地的客户。如果他们能接入多条铁路,或者需要运输较短的距离,他们就有其他铁路公司或卡车可以承运货物。比如可以想象一个很容易用卡车运走的集装箱。
And the second group would then be customers who do have a degree of choice. And so if they have access to multiple railways or need to move shorter distances, they'd have other railroads or trucks that could haul the freight.
And so picture a shipping container that can easily be moved by a truck, for example.
正是如此。所以我们无法确切知道他们的客户在这两类中各自占多大比例,但我认为很明显,他们客户群中有很大一部分是相对难以被抢走的。
Exactly. So we can't know for sure what the allocation for their customers would be in each of these two groups, but I think it's clear that there is a large portion of their customer base that is relatively uncontestable.
而且,尽管 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 经营所在的这三个国家都有各种监管,一级铁路公司在过去二十年的大部分时间里仍然实现了高于通胀的提价。所以定价权依然存在,但肯定存在一个上限。
And even with all the regulation in all three countries that came Pacific Kansas City operates in, class one railroads have pushed through price increases above inflation for most of the last two decades.
So, you know, the pricing power is still there, but there's definitely a ceiling in place.
所以 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的下一个优势在于处理能力。虽然你可能会说这也许算不上多强的护城河,因为他们的前CEO Hunter Harrison 曾在六家一级铁路公司中的四家帮助推行了这种精准调度铁路运输。
但他确实推行的这套简单系统大幅改善了 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的利润率,而且在他离开很久之后仍然延续了下来。
So the next advantage that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has is in processing power. Although you can argue this is maybe less of a moat because Hunter Harrison, their former CEO, helped implement this precision scheduled railroading at four of the six class one railroads.
But that simple system which he did implement has greatly improved Canadian Pacific Kansas City's margins and it stuck around for long after he's left.
Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的运营比率仍在60%左右,属于业内最好的水平之一,但我得承认,领先幅度并不是最大的。
Canadian Pacific Kansas City still has operating ratios of about 60% which is among the best in the industry but I will admit not by the widest of margins.
所以 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 还有另外几项支撑其处理能力优势的利好:他们的平均列车速度提高了约7%,同比上升;他们还把终端停留时间缩短了16%,并略微改善了机车生产率和燃料效率。
So another few benefits of Canadian Pacific Kansas City that would support processing power advantages was its increase in their average train speed which went up about 7% year-over-year.
They also decreased their terminal dwell time by 16% and then marginally improved their locomotive productivity as well as uh fuel efficiency.
还有另一个优势,Canadian Pacific Kansas City 有,我认为许多大型铁路公司也有,你刚才用钾肥和谷物提升机的例子稍微提到过。那就是,当客户建厂来生产和运输某种大宗商品时,无论是谷物、煤炭还是别的什么,他们做的其实是长达数十年的决策,对吧?
企业本身会花钱修建铁路专用线,有时甚至购置自己的铁路车厢,同时把整个物流流程都围绕 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的调度来设计。基本上,客户已经花钱把自己的设施和运营在物理上接入 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的线路及其装卸基础设施。
And there's another advantage that Canadian Pacific Kansas City and I think many major railroads have that you touched on a little earlier with your example on pot ash and grain elevators.
And that is when a customer builds a plant to produce and and ship a commodity whether that's grain, coal or or whatever it is, they are making really decadesl long decisions, right?
the the business itself will have spent money on things like rail spurs, sometimes even their own rail cars, all while designing their whole logistics process around Canadian Pacific, Kansas City schedule.
And basically, the customer has already paid to physically tie its facilities and operations into Canadian Pacific Kansas City's lines and their loading infrastructure.
所以,如果一座谷物提升机已经有了这样的设施,他们真的不太可能尝试转投 Canadian National,因为那将需要花费大量时间、金钱和精力去搬迁并重新搭建一切,才能让自己的产品通过另一张网络流通。
So, if a grain elevator has that setup in place, it's really unlikely that they're going to try and and switch to Canadian National because it would have to spend a lot of time and money and energy moving and and setting things up all over again to make its product be able to flow through a different network.
除了这些沉没成本之外,我认为可靠性本身也很值得一说。Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的效率确实是一个巨大优势,能把客户留住。比如,如果你是汽车制造商,采用准时制生产,而你的零部件因为竞争对手不够可靠而没送到或迟到,那么你整个工厂的运转效率就会远低于峰值。所以,在运费上省下几个百分点,真的不值得。
And on top of those sunk costs, I think there's just a lot to be said for reliability, too. And Canadian Pacific Kansas City's efficiency is really a huge advantage that keeps customers around.
If, for instance, you're an automaker running just in time production and your parts either don't show up or arrive late because the competitor isn't as reliable, then your whole plant won't be running anywhere near peak efficiency.
So, saving a few percentage points on freights just really isn't worth it.
没错。当我用我的客户忠诚度框架来评估 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 时,他们的得分非常非常高,尤其是在沉没成本、高失败成本和搭建成本这些方面。这些也是业务中迫使客户重复选择的其他领域。
他们得分最低的地方是品牌,这大概一点也不令人意外。
That's right. And when I ran Canadian Pacific Kansas City through my customer loyalty framework, they scored very, very well, especially on things like sunk costs, high failure costs, and setup costs.
These are other areas of the business that force repeat customers. The place that they score the lowest in is brand, which probably isn't a surprise by any means.
这条护城河当然是真实存在的,对吧?我们谈到的三国网络、拉雷多桥,还有我们梳理过的转换成本。这些都是我作为投资者会相当放心地认为在未来几十年里都是持久资产的东西。而且它们都不会消失。
The mode is is certainly real, right? You've got the the three country network that we talked about, the Laredo Bridge, and then the switching costs that we've also walked through.
Those are all things that I would feel pretty comfortable in as an investor as being lasting assets for decades to come. And and none of them are are going anywhere.
我更希望看到的是,这条护城河能再次体现在数字上,因为一项不可替代的资产,加上与客户如此紧密绑定的关系,对我来说只有当他们真的能利用这种力量转化为更好的定价和更好的资本回报,尤其是比 BNSF 更好的回报时,才真正有吸引力。
And what I'd want to see more of is that mode actually again showing up in the numbers because an irreplaceable asset with uh you know such tied in relationships with its customers is only interesting to me if they can actually use that power to translate into better pricing and better returns on capital over time especially better than BNSFs.
而这正是 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 在他们完成的这桩大合并之后仍需证明的部分。
And that is the part that Canadian Pacific Kansas City still needs to prove on the other side of of this big merger that they've done.
是的。总体来看,我认为Canadian Pacific Kansas City在我见过的企业里,拥有最大的护城河之一。它不会被技术颠覆。如果有人有5000亿美元可以花,他们大概率会去建数据中心,而不是修铁路和铁路场站。
而且就算他们有那么多钱,要获得技术诀窍、许可和土地,从而接近Canadian Pacific Kansas City的网络,看起来也非常不可能。现有的铁路运营商甚至建不出Canadian Pacific Kansas City现在拥有的同一张网络,这恰恰说明这有多难。
所以,他们大概率还不如直接买下另一家一级铁路公司,尽管那样他们仍然得不到Canadian Pacific Kansas City目前拥有的同等地理覆盖范围。
Yeah. Overall, I think Canadian Pacific Kansas City has one of the largest modes in a business that I've ever seen. You know, it can't be disrupted by technology. And if someone had half a trillion dollars to spend, chances are they just go build data centers, not train tracks and rail yards.
And even if they had that kind of money, well, getting the knowhow, the permits, and the land to even approach Canadian Pacific Kansas City's network just seems very unlikely. existing railroad operators can't even build out the same network that Canadian Pacific Kansas City now has, which just shows you how difficult it is.
So, they'd probably be better off just buying one of the other class one railroad companies, even though they still wouldn't get the same geographic range that Canadian Pacific Kansas City currently has.
但事情变得稍微复杂一点的地方,正是你刚才谈到的:好吧,他们做的这些事是建立在一个有护城河的企业之上,但它是否真的在为股东创造有意义的回报,还是说Kane Pacific Kansas City只是又一个BNSF式的情况?
But where things get a little more complicated is kind of what you just discussed there, which is okay, they are doing these things based around a business that has a moat, but is it actually generating a meaningful return to shareholders, or is Kane Pacific Kansas City just kind of another BNSF type situation?
所以在Kansas City Southern交易之前,Canadian Pacific至少对一家铁路公司来说,是一家资本效率非常高的企业。从2016年到2020年,它的调整后投入资本回报率大约在14%到17%。
我认为这是一个非常非常好的数字,远高于其资本成本,这基本上意味着再投资在创造股东价值。
So before the Kansas City Southern deal, Canadian Pacific was a very capital efficient business at least for a railroad. So from 2016 to 2020, it earned adjusted returns on invested capital of about 14 to 17%.
So I think that's a very very good number and well above its cost of capital and that basically meant that reinvestment was producing shareholder value.
这些数字很棒,虽然它们绝不是软件公司那种数字,但这些数字我个人还是能接受的。而且它们持续高于14%,这是一个非常明显的信号,说明这家企业具有一定的持久性。
Now, these numbers are great and while they aren't, you know, software numbers by any means, these are numbers that I personally can still get around. And the fact that they were consistently above 14% is a very obvious signal that this business had some durability.
但如果我们看看这个数字自Kansas City Southern交易以来不幸发生了怎样的变化,那种明显的优势已经消退了不少。公司自己的投入资本回报率,也就是它所称的调整后ROIC,2021年下降了约8%,2022年下降了7%。而到了2025年,这个数字只有6.9%。
But if we look at how this number unfortunately has changed since the Kansas City Southern deal, that obvious strength has faded quite a bit. So, the company's own return on invested capital, which it calls adjusted ROIC, fell about 8% in 2021 and then 7% in 2022. And then for 2025, the number is just 6.9%.
简单说一下调整后投入资本回报率。这仍然是他们内部使用的一个不错的数字。不过,他们确实从这个数字中剔除了递延所得税负债。所以如果把它们加回去,投入资本回报率大约会低一个百分点。但说到底,无论我用我自己的数字还是公司的数字,它们仍然与曾经相当亮眼的历史数字相差很远。
So a quick note on the adjusted return on invested capital. It's still a good number that they use internally. However, they do exclude deferred tax liabilities from this figure.
So if you add them back in, the return on invested capital is about a percentage point lower. But you know, at the end of the day, whether I use my own numbers or the companies, they're still just a long way from the historical numbers that were once quite impressive.
是的。6%到7%,这两个数字都没有真正让我产生多少信心。尤其是考虑到这家公司似乎不太可能被竞争对手颠覆,你本会期待更好的回报。
Yeah. I mean, 6 to 7%, neither of those figures really inspire a ton of confidence in me. And especially when you consider that this company doesn't seem too likely to be disrupted by competitors, you would expect better returns.
而在并购中,这些大型交易有时确实会严重模糊真实的回报数字,至少短期内是这样。比如,Kansas City Southern交易规模高达310亿美元,绝对是巨无霸。所以我的假设是,对于这样规模的交易,这些数字大幅提高了Canadian Pacific Kansas City的资本分母,而这需要回报显著增加,才能维持同样的效率水平。
而且,这些协同效应往往需要时间,才能在合并后企业实际的利润表结果中体现出来。
And with M&A, these large deals can sometimes really obiscate the real return figures, at least in the short term. And and so for instance, the Kansas City Southern deal was just absolutely massive at $31 billion.
So my assumption would be that these numbers for a deal that size have significantly increased Canadian Pacific Kansas City's capital denominator and that uh requires a significant increase in returns just to maintain the these same efficiency levels.
Uh and it sort of can take time often for those synergies to to prove themselves out in the actual income statement results of the combined business.
是的,我觉得你说得很到位。对于这些做更大交易的更大公司来说,这可能是个相当大的问题,因为并购未必是它们的强项。它们出去收购企业,固定资产和营运资金等瞬间增加,不幸的是,这只会让它们的投入资本变得更臃肿,而协同效应往往需要时间才能形成。
所以即使投入资本数字上升,投入资本回报率的上半部分也可能需要数年才能跟上。我认为这很可能就是Ky Pacific Kansas City身上发生的情况。
Yeah, I think you really nailed it there. And that can be a pretty big problem for these larger companies doing larger deals where, you know, M&A isn't necessarily their forte.
You know, they go out, they buy businesses, they get these instant increases in their fixed assets and in things like working capital, and this just serves unfortunately to fatten their invested capital, but it often takes time for synergies to form.
So even when the invested capital number increases, it can take years for the top part of the return on invested capital numbers to catch up. And I think this is probably what has happened to Ky Pacific Kansas City.
当你承接像钢铁这样大的东西时,资产负债表一夜之间就变了。但利润表,正如我提到的,它需要慢慢来。这有点像一位想减少竞争的企业主。于是他们买下了竞争对手,而对方恰好就在街对面,交易完成那天,他们将拥有两倍的门店,但他们也已经开出了一张非常大的支票。
所有现金一次性流出,即使这没有立即反映在利润表上,但所有能与两家企业产生协同的客户,不会在第一天就出现,对吧?要弄清楚哪些重叠的费用可以削减、向谁交叉推广最有效,都需要时间。与此同时,你必须耐心等待,让两家企业基本上学会作为一个合并后的单一实体尽可能最优地协同运作。
When you take on something as big as a steel, the balance sheet changes overnight. But the income statement, again, as I alluded to, I mean, it takes its sweet time. And it's kind of like a a business owner who wants to decrease competition.
So, they buy out their competition, who happens to be across the street, and on the day that deal closes, they will own twice as many locations, but they've also already written a very large check. all the cash went out the door at once, even if that's not immediately reflected in their uh income statement, but all the customers who can synergize with both businesses, they're not going to show up on on day one, right?
It will take time to figure out which overlapping expenses can be cut and who to crossromote most effectively to. In the meantime, you have to be patient while the two businesses basically learn to work together as optimally as possible as a single consolidated unit.
所以如果Canadian Pacific Kansas City现在正是这种情况,那么假设应该是:一旦这些协同效应显现,它们的资本效率数字、资本回报率就会恢复。毕竟,我不认为这家铁路公司仅仅因为变大了就突然变成了一门更差的生意。
而且正如我们讨论过的,如果说有什么变化,不断增长的网络实际上应该会改善这门生意。那么,你认为未来几年投入资本回报率会如何变化?
So if that's what's happening right now with Canadian Pacific Kansas City, then the assumption should be that their capital efficiency number, their returns on capital will recover once those synergies show up.
And after all, the railroad I don't think got suddenly a worse business to be in just because it got bigger. And as we've discussed, if anything, the growing network should actually improve the business.
So, how do you see returns on invested capital moving over the next few years?
是的。这笔交易是几年前完成的。所以我们可以回顾2022年,那是这些数字首次在资产负债表上合并的第一年,我们可以看到,股本、债务以及营运资金等项目都出现了相当大的激增。但回答你的问题,这有点难回答,因为我们已经经历了三年相当平庸的投入资本回报率数字,但也有一些积极因素。
随着利润继续小幅上升,他们已经展现出一些协同效应。网络运行良好,看起来协同效应开始有望显现。尽管交易完成后营业利润率确实受到了打击,但它似乎实际上恢复得不错,营业利润率似乎正朝着正确的方向发展。
Yeah. So, the deal closed a few years ago. So, we can look back at 2022, which was the first year that the numbers were consolidated on the balance sheet, and we can see that they had a pretty large spike in things like equity, debt, as well as working capital.
But to your question, you know, it's kind of tough to answer because we've had three years of pretty mediocre return on invested capital numbers, but there are some positives. So, they have shown some synergies as profits have continued to go up a little bit.
The network is running well, and it appears that synergies are starting to hopefully come through. And even though operating margin definitely took a hit after the deal closed, it seems to have actually recovered well, and operating margin seems to be trending in the right direction.
但说到资本效率,这些数字几乎纹丝不动。我认为现在时间已经过去足够久了,如果这是时间问题,我们大概率会看到资本效率数字至少接近历史水平或更接近那个水平,但它就是没有真正动起来。所以在我看来,如果这笔交易完美奏效,那么我们会看到投入资本回报率数字下降,然后它会稳步回升到这些历史数字。但我认为,到目前为止,这些数字并不支持这一点。
But when it comes to capital efficiency, you know, the numbers just have barely budged. I think enough time has now passed that if this were a timing issue, we'd probably see the capital efficiency number at least approximate historical levels or get closer to that, but it's just not really moving.
So, in my view, if this deal worked out perfectly, well, then we would see a drop in the return of vested capital number. Then it would steadily rise back up towards these historical numbers.
But I think the numbers, you know, so far just don't support this.
现在,这可能意味着几件事。主要问题很可能已经固化在他们最终为收购Kansas City Southern支付的价格里,因为他们为Kansas City Southern支付了很高的溢价。
这将永久性地改变他们的投入资本基础。所以像商誉这些东西,它们不会磨损,也不会被折旧。而且即使利润增加了,投入资本回报率要继续向上趋势,也需要时间。
Now, this can mean a few things. The main issue is probably baked into the price that they ended up paying for the Kansas City Southern acquisition because they paid this large premium for Kansas City Southern.
It's permanently going to change their invested capital base. So things like Goodwill, you know, they just don't wear out and they don't get depreciated. And even though profits have increased, it's going to take time for the return on invested capital to continue to trend upward.
这不算最好的局面,但总归是隧道尽头有光,对吧?你刚才提到了商誉,给不熟悉的人解释一下,商誉基本上就是你收购时支付的、超过可辨认净资产公允价值的那部分溢价。也就是可辨认资产的公允价值减去你承接的负债。
所以如果你花100亿美元做一笔收购,而这些可辨认净资产价值10亿美元,那你就要记入90亿美元的商誉。这里“可辨认”这个词非常重要,这也是我一直在强调它的原因,因为无形资产,比如客户关系,或者在Canadian Pacific Kansas City这个案例里,是他们自己线路上获得的墨西哥特许经营权,这些都记在他们的资产负债表上。
这些全都按公允价值计价,而商誉就是这一切之后剩下的部分。正如你提到的,商誉通常不会被摊销。所以它会以全额价值无限期地留在资产负债表上。但它确实必须做减值测试,至少每年一次,或者如果发生了某些表明被收购业务的价值低于账面上已记录价值的事情,就要更早进行测试。
It's not the greatest situation, but there is a a light at the end of the tunnel, right? You mentioned there that goodwill and for those who are unfamiliar uh is basically the premium paid above the fair value of the identifiable net assets that you're acquiring.
Meaning the fair value of the identifiable assets minus the liabilities you take on. So if you pay $10 billion for an acquisition and these identifiable net assets are worth a billion, then you're going to book $9 billion of goodwill.
And the identifiable term matters a lot here. That's why I keep saying it because intangibles sort of like these customer relationships or in Canadian Pacific Kansas City's case the Mexican concession that they got on their own line on their balance sheet.
Um those are all valued at at fair value and and goodwill is just whatever is left over after all of that. And as you mentioned there goodwill typically does not get amvertised.
So it sits on the balance sheet at full value indefinitely. And it does have to be tested though for impairment at least once a year or sooner if something happens that suggests the acquired business is worth less than what's been accounted for on the books.
所以如果商誉被减记,实际上会通过减少投入资本来改善Canadian Pacific Kansas City的资本效率指标。但那也等于承认他们为这笔交易严重多付了钱。我确信他们宁愿不向市场公开承认这种事。
And so if Goodwill were written down, it would actually improve Canadian Pacific Kansas City's capital efficiency metrics by reducing invested capital. But it would also be an admission that they seriously overpaid for the deal.
And I I'm sure they would rather not openly admit that kind of thing to the market.
是的,完全没错。我认为这是会计上那种奇特之处之一。如果Canadian Pacific Kansas City在某个时候被迫大幅减记商誉——我不认为这会发生——那么是的,他们的投入资本回报率会瞬间跳升。
但我认为真正的隧道尽头的光,是要看得非常非常深入幕后。所以从某些方面看,情况似乎确实在改善。但你需要看一个与投入资本回报率相邻的数字,也就是增量投入资本回报率,才能真正看到这一点。
所以从2024年到2025年那段时期,这个数字实际上已经爬升到超过12%。所以,尽管管理层的目标是把投入资本回报率重新拉回到15%左右的中段,你知道,这看起来确实很难做到,但回报率开始回升绝对是个好兆头。
Yeah, that's completely true. And I think it's one of those kind of quirks of accounting. If Canadian Pacific, Kansas City were forced to write down a big chunk of goodwill at some point, which I don't see happening, well then yes, their return on invested capital would jump instantly.
But I think the real light at the end of the tunnel is if you look very very much behind the scenes. So it does appear if you look in some ways that things are improving. But you need to look at an adjacent number to returns on invested capital, which is returns on incremental invested capital to really see this.
So the number for that period from 2024 until 2025 has actually crept up to over 12%. So while management's goal is to get return on invested capital back up to the mid- teens, you know, it does seem difficult to do, but it's definitely promising that returns are starting to creep back up.
这是一家铁路公司,而该行业的大多数企业都以派发股息和大规模回购而闻名。所以2025年,Canadian Pacific Kansas City以约40亿美元回购了3700万股。
然后在2026年上半年,他们又回购了大约1700万股。所以尽管收购显著增加了他们的稀释后股本,回购的规模也相当可观。而且自2022年以来,他们实际上以大约1%的复合年增长率减少了股本。
This is a business that is a railroad and and most businesses in that industry are known for paying dividends and also doing buybacks at scale. And so in 2025, Canadian Pacific Kansas City bought back 37 million shares for about $4 billion.
And then in the first half of 2026, they bought back another 17 million shares or so. So even though the acquisitions significantly increased their diluted share count, the buybacks have been pretty meaningful too.
And since 2022, they've actually reduced their shares by about a 1% kagger.
不过我对这些回购确实有意见。我认为过去几年的大部分回购,似乎都是在——我该怎么说呢——大致接近内在价值、或者可能高于内在价值的水平上进行的。而为什么这是件坏事的机制很简单。回购是公司代表留下来的、继续持有业务的股东,买回公司自身的一部分股权。
所以如果它支付的价格低于股票的实际价值,那么每花一美元,就为留下的股东买回了超过一美元的价值。这就是回购的好情况。但如果它支付的价格高于股票价值,那么价值就从留下的股东转移到了以这个溢价卖出的股东手里。
而公司本来还不如直接派发股息或者持有现金。所以除非我对内在价值的估计是错的,否则这些回购真的不是资本的最佳用途。
Uh I do have an issue with the buybacks though. I think much of the buybacks over the past few years, they seem to have been done at sort of what I would call a rough approximation of uh exactly at intrinsic value or perhaps above it.
And so the mechanics of why this is a bad thing are pretty simple. A buyback is the company buying back a stake in itself on behalf of the shareholders who are staying and continuing to own the business.
So if it pays less than what the shares are actually worth, then every dollar spent buys more than a dollar of value for those remaining owners. And so that is a good case of buybacks.
But if it pays more than the shares are worth, then the value transfers from the holders who stay to the ones who sell at this premium. And the company then would have been better off just paying off a dividend or holding the cash.
So unless I'm wrong on my intrinsic value estimate, then really these buybacks were not the best use of capital.
是的,Sean,我想我和你看法一致。而且我还要在你刚才说的基础上再加一个问题。这些股票购买有一部分是通过杠杆完成的。所以如果只看经营性现金流,它确实覆盖了他们的股息和回购,但你必须记住,Canadian Pacific Kansas City确实有每年都必须处理的再投资需求。
所以这些回购有一部分是通过发行新债券和出售巴拿马运河铁路的股份来融资的。公平地说,杠杆的规模不大,但你知道,杠杆还是增加了,就为了帮助这些回购融资。
Yeah, I think I'm right there with you, Sean. And I have yet another issue to layer on top of what you just mentioned. So these share purchases were partially completed using leverage.
So if you look purely at operating cash flow, it definitely does cover their dividends and buybacks, but you have to remember that Canadian Pacific Kansas City does have reinvestment needs that must be attended to on an annual basis.
So part of these buybacks were funded by issuing new bonds and selling a stake in the Panama Canal Railway. Now it was a small amount of leverage to be fair, but you know, leverage still increased just to help fund these buybacks.
好吧,如果部分回购是靠债务融资的,那绝对值得看看今天的资产负债表是什么样子。截至最近一个季度,Canadian Pacific Kansas City背负着约250亿美元的债务。
所以,如果我们用管理层偏好的债务与EBITDA比率来看——我要补充一句,这跟净债务与EBITDA比率很相似——大约是3.2倍。这比一年前的3倍略有上升。而这与大多数铁路竞争对手处于同一区间。
所以我认为这里没有太多可担心的。毕竟,铁路是那种资产能产生稳定现金的业务,而且这些现金应该会在未来几十年里持续流向它们。所以贷款方非常乐意以这些资产为抵押放贷。
Well, if parts of the buybacks were funded by debt, it's definitely worth peeking into what the balance sheet looks like today. And Canadian Pacific Kansas City is carrying about $25 billion in debt as of the most recent quarter.
And so, if we view this through management's preferred debt to IBITA metric, which I'll add is pretty similar to net debt to IBITa, it comes out to about 3.2 times. And that's up slightly from three times a year earlier.
And this is in the same ballpark as most railroad competitors. So I don't think there's too much to worry about here. Railroads, after all, are businesses whose assets produce steady cash, and that cash should continue to flow to them for for decades to come.
So lenders are more than happy to lend against them.
而对于这样一家现金流几乎和公用事业以外任何企业一样可预测的业务,说实话,我绝对更放心让他们加杠杆,而不是一家周期性公司、甚至某些科技公司。而实际上,比表面比率更让我在意的是,杠杆正朝哪个方向漂移、为什么漂移,以及杠杆是不是在为了回购而不是为了增长而悄悄上升?这种事会让我作为股东感到不安,
And for really a business like this with cash flows that are about as predictable as you'll find for any business outside of a utility, I'm definitely more comfortable with them having leverage than with a cyclical or even uh some tech companies to be completely honest.
And what I actually care about more than the headline ratio is which direction that leverage is is drifting in and why and is leverage creeping up to fund buybacks rather than growth?
That kind of thing makes me uncomfortable as a shareholder,
对吧?我同意。我认为管理层那个指标对我来说没问题。我也喜欢用一个类似的指标,但我也喜欢看净债务与自由现金流的对比。所以我也希望这个数字非常低,最好是过去十二个月自由现金流的三倍或以下。
这背后的想法很简单。如果情况变糟,我想知道这家企业能在3年内还清债务。这给企业带来一些稳健性,而我显然非常看重这一点。所以,Canadian Pacific Kansas City的净债务与自由现金流之比实际上是10倍。
他们不打算增加资本开支。所以,随着自由现金流在未来一年左右扩大,这个比率或许会降到八到九倍。但不管怎样,这绝对比我通常希望看到的要高得多。
right? I agree. And I think that management metric is fine by me. I like to also use a similar metric, but I also like to look at how net debt compares to free cash flow. So I also would prefer this number to be very low, preferably at maybe three times or less trailing free cash flow.
So the idea behind this is quite simple. If things go south, I'd like to know that the business could pay off its debt within 3 years. This gives the business some robustness, which I'm obviously a very big fan of.
So, Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's net debt to free cash flow is actually 10 times. So, they aren't planning on increasing capex. So, perhaps that ratio comes down to eight or nine as free cash flow expands over the next year or so.
But either way, it's definitely a lot higher than I usually like to see.
不过公平地说,就像你刚才暗示的那样,我认为在债务方面,铁路公司确实应该得到一些宽容。Canadian Pacific Kansas City的债务结构非常保守,大部分固定利率债务的利息由经营利润覆盖超过六倍。
所以,由于现金流在很长时期内非常安全,贷款方绝对愿意提供这种长期限的债务,我说的是非常非常长,长达几十年。所以他们有一笔债券要到2115年才到期,到那时我们大概率早就不在了。所以,如果我的曾孙辈有人在听这个,去查查他们的本金还了没有。[笑声] 那可真是一个不得了的还款期。
In fairness though, kind of to what you just uh alluded to, railroads definitely do deserve some leeway, I think, when it comes to debt. Canadian Pacific Kansas City's debt is structured very conservatively and most of its fixed rate debt and interest is covered more than six times by operating income.
So, because the cash flows are very secure over long time periods, lenders are definitely going to be willing to offer these kind of long-term maturities, and I'm talking very, very long, like decades long.
So, one of their bond matures all the way out in 2115, by which time we'll probably be long gone. So, if any of my great grandchildren are listening to this, go check if their principal was paid back. [laughter] That is a that is one heck of a of a payback period there.
而如果看债务,更大的风险并不是他们目前背负的债务,而是他们在不久的将来是否需要在某个时点进行再融资。如果真的需要,考虑到我们看到的通胀上升,以及过去几个月美国国债市场可以说是彻底崩了,那大概率会是在明显更高的利率下进行。
所以他们在2020和2021年利率处于真正谷底时进行债务再融资,是非常聪明的。但所有这些债务都会在某个时点到期。其中有一笔实际上在2026年底就到期。而且同样,按今天的利率,他们未来的利息成本在结构上就会大幅上升,直到下一轮再融资到来,希望那时利率更低。
基本上我们已经看到的是,在上个季度,公司的利息支出以两位数的百分比增长了。
And if we look at debt, the bigger risk isn't the debt that they carry right now, but really whether or not they will need to refinance at some point in the near future. And and uh if they do, uh that will likely be at significantly higher rates given the uptick in inflation we've seen and really the bottom falling out of the the Treasury market in the last few months.
And so they were uh very smart to refinance debt in 2020 and 2021 when interest rates were at really rock bottom. But all of those debts will come due at some point. And one of them actually even comes due at the end of 2026.
And again, at today's rates, the the interest costs for them going forward just structurally are are going to increase significantly until the next round of of refinancing comes hopefully at lower rates.
And basically what we've already seen is uh in this last quarter, the company's interest expense increased uh by double-digit percentages.
是的,总体而言,我对Can Pacific Kansas City的债务并不是特别担心。它有点让我想起American Tower,这类资产处于非常非常强的寡头垄断之中,因此贷款方会允许你既加杠杆,又拥有很长的到期期限。
这是个相当不错的优势。但如果他们确实在一段时间内看到业务放缓,那他们就有无法兑现股东回报的风险。他们得先偿还债权人,这就意味着要削减股息或回购之类的东西。而投资这类业务的投资者真的很不喜欢看到这种情况。
Yeah, I think overall I'm not super concerned about debt when it comes to Can Pacific Kansas City. It kind of reminds me a little bit of American Tower where you have these assets that are just in a very very strong oligopoly and therefore lenders will just allow you to both lever up as well as have these very long maturity dates.
It's a pretty nice advantage. But if they do see a slowdown in business for a time, then they risk failing to deliver shareholder returns. They'd have to pay back debtors first, which would mean cutting things like dividends or buybacks. and investors into those businesses really do not like to see that.
而这些都会影响管理层的决策,有时影响还很大。真正重要的是要考虑管理层到底在优先考虑什么,而这在每家公司并不相同。所以我们不妨在这里更仔细地看看管理层。最上面是Keith Creel,你之前提到他自2017年起担任CEO,这使他成为所有一级铁路公司中任期最长的CEO。
这确实有点令人意外。想想这些业务有多稳定,你会以为CEO们往往会在这里长期留任。而当Canadian Pacific在2021年宣布收购Kansas City Southern的交易时,董事会专门给了他约517,000份股票期权作为特别授予,目的就是把他留任到至少2026年。
而作为这笔授予的交换,他的年度长期激励奖励被削减了,基本上就是作为对冲,对吧?而这个留任窗口在今年年初关闭了。所以,自合并以来第一次,Creel不再有那种把他留在公司里的金手铐,但看起来他也没有任何离开的计划。
And these can all affect management's decision-m to sometimes a large degree. It's really important to take into account just what management is prioritizing and it's not the same at every company.
So h how about we try and look at management a little closer here. And at the top you've got Keith Creel, who you mentioned earlier has been the CEO since 2017, and that makes him the longest tenure CEO of any class one railroad.
And that's definitely a bit surprising. Uh when you think about how stable these businesses are, you would think that uh the CEOs would would tend to stick around here. And when Canadian Pacific announced the Kansas City Southern deal back in 2021, the board gave him a special grant of about 517,000 stock options specifically to keep him retained until at least 2026.
And in exchange for that grant, his annual long-term incentive awards were trimmed as basically an offset, right? And that retention window closed at the beginning of this year.
So, for the first time since the merger, Creel doesn't have, you know, these golden handcuffs that are keeping him inside the business, but it also doesn't seem like he has any plans to leave.
我觉得这里值得一提,因为如果我是股东,我至少会想一想会有什么样的继任规划。考虑到Creel是如何进入Canadian Pacific Kansas City并帮助整合Kansas City Southern合并的,我认为他做得相当不错,但自这笔交易完成以来,为股东创造的价值绝对算不上出色。
不过自2023年以来,股价以约4.5%的速度复合增长,股息率为1%。我不会假装自己对整合一家铁路公司有多难有什么特别的洞见。我会认为这非常难。所以也许我对他有点太苛刻了,但这只是数字告诉我的。
Um, I think it's worth mentioning here because if I were a shareholder, I'd at least be thinking about what kind of succession planning there would be. Now, given how Creel has come into Canadian Pacific, Kansas City and helped integrate the Kansas City Southern uh merger, I think he's done a pretty fine job, but the value creation for shareholders since this deal has gone through just hasn't been amazing by any means.
Though since 2023, shares have compounded at about 4 1/2% with a 1% dividend yield. I won't pretend like I have any special insights into how hard it is to integrate a railroad.
I would assume it's very hard. So perhaps I'm being a little hard on him, but this is just what the numbers tell me.
这很难说,因为在交易之前,Canadian Pacific表现相当不错,但交易之后,增长和有吸引力的资本回报变得更难获得。所以也许我们有偏见,但我们不妨更仔细地看看Creel如今在哪些方面受到激励,以及这发生了怎样的变化。
It's tough to say because before the deal, Canadian Pacific was doing pretty well, but growth and attractive returns on capital have been harder to come by after the deal. So maybe we're biased, but how about we take a closer look at what Creel is incentivized on these days and and how that has changed.
当然。Creel激励计划的好处在于,约93%的目标薪酬是有风险的。所以他的奖金有一部分与财务和安全指标挂钩。财务部分在运营比率和运营收入之间平均分配。安全部分则在列车事故频率和人身伤害频率等因素之间分配。
2025年,运营比率正好落在目标上,但运营收入实际上低于目标。所以,这些数字还不错,因为它们确实反映了运营利润率和运营收入,但我认为它缺少了Canadian Pacific此前真正出名的一点,那就是基于投入资本回报率进行激励。
所以,他们说过希望在某个时点回到这一点,但会在适当的时候回到这个KPI。不过我不太确定那是什么意思,也不知道该怎么理解。
Sure. So the good thing about Creel's incentive program is that about 93% of target pay is at risk. So part of his bonus is tied to things like financial and safety measures. So the financial part is split evenly between operating ratio and operating income.
The safety part is split between factors such as train accident frequency and personal injury frequency. In 2025, the operating ratio landed right on target, but operating income was actually below the target.
So, you know, these are decent figures since they do reflect operating margins and operating income, but I think it's missing something that Canadian Pacific was actually really well known for before, which was incentivizing based on returns on invested capital.
So, they have said that they want to get back to that at some point, but they'll return to this KPI at the appropriate time. I'm not really sure what that means though or how to perceive it.
鉴于收购以来投入资本回报率已经下降了不少,我认为暂时去掉这个指标确实有一定道理,因为要公平地保留它,唯一的办法就是大幅下调他们的目标和预期,而这样做从长期来看并不能向股东传递正确的信息。
为什么要在一家长期资本配置相当出色的公司里接受平庸呢?而目前其他的业绩指标是基于自由现金流之类的东西,以及将股价与类似行业企业的基准进行比较。而自由现金流正是取代ROIC的指标。
所以这完全不是一个糟糕的指标,但薪酬框架发生转变时,总是一个警示信号。
Well, given how returns on invested capital have dropped so far since the acquisition, I I think that it did make some sense to temporarily get rid of that measure simply because the only way to uh be able to to fairly keep it would be to drastically cut their target and expectations and doing that doesn't really send the right message to shareholders longer term. uh why accept mediocrity in a company that had allocated capital quite well for for such a long period of time.
And right now the other performance measures are are based on things like free cash flow and then comparing the share price to a benchmark of businesses in similar industries. And free cash flow is what replaced ROIC.
So it's not a bad metric at all, but it's always a yellow flag when the compensation framework shifts.
而薪酬委员会主席在委托书里提到这件事,是一个相当有力的信号,说明股东希望这个投入资本回报率KPI回归。是的,我认为这个替换确实有影响。没错,自由现金流是个不错的数字,至少它考虑了资本支出之类的东西,但它更多是一个绝对数字。
所以,如果Canadian Pacific Kansas City增长,它就会获得更多现金流。
And the fact that the chair of the compensation committee has brought it up in proxy is is quite a powerful signal that shareholders want this return on invested capital KPI to come back.
Yeah, I think the swap really does matter. You know, yes, free cash flow is a decent number and that at least takes into account things like capital expenditure, but you know, it's more of an absolute number.
So, if Canadian Pacific Kansas City grows, it will get more cash flow.
但仅仅因为他们收购了Kansas City Southern,就意味着自由现金流也应该增长,原因很简单,他们只是给自己又添了一项产生现金流的业务。
But the mere fact that they bought, you know, Kansas City Southern means that free cash flow should also grow simply because they just added another cash flowing business to themselves.
投入资本回报率既捕捉了现金流的增长,也捕捉了其他一系列我认为非常非常大的、确实重要的调整,比如为了在未来获得更大规模的现金流需要什么样的投资。
Returns on invested capital captures both the increase in cash flow, but also a bunch of other I think very very big adjustments that do matter and that's things such as what type of investment was needed to get that larger amount of cash flow into the future.
所以,如果纯粹只看自由现金流,它的作用就没那么一样了。
And so if you look just purely at free cash flow, it just doesn't have quite the same function.
是的,这里也不能忘了持股比例。Creel的总持股价值约2700万美元,但这包括期权。而当我们考虑他今天实际拥有的股份时,大约相当于Canadian Pacific Kansas City总股数的0.01%。
Yeah, we can't forget ownership stakes either here. Creel's total stake is worth about $27 million, but that includes options. And when we consider what he actually owns today, it comes out to about 0.01% of Canadian Pacific Kansas City's total share count.
这并不特别令人意外,因为除非你是公司的原始创始人,否则很难积累起巨大的股权,尤其是对一家已有近200年历史的公司来说。
And it's not terribly surprising cuz unless you're an original founder of a company, uh it's hard to have a massive equity stake built up, especially for a company that's nearly 200 years old.
不过我认为内部人总持股仍然有点令人失望,只有0.1%。所以管理团队其他成员有一定的利益一致性,我相信这占他们净资产的相当一部分,但至少在理论上,你会希望这个数字大概率更高一些。
And uh total insider ownership though I think is still a bit disappointing at just 0.1%. So um the rest of the management team has some alignment uh and I'm sure it's a good chunk of their net worth but at least in theory you would like to see that number probably being higher.
是的,我也一样,Sean,而且我也没能找到任何有意义的内部人买入。所以他们持股增加的大部分敞口主要来自期权之类的东西。
Yeah me too Sean and I wasn't able to find any meaningful insider buying as well. So most of their exposure to increased ownership is mainly through things like options.
所以,如果把它和我们看过的其他一些公司相比,比如Haiko,那整个家族的财富都与公司的成败绑在一起。遗憾的是,在Canadian Pacific Kansas City身上就是看不到那种同样的利益一致性。
So if you compare that to some of the other businesses that we've looked at like Haiko for instance, you know, the family's entire wealth is tied to the success of the company.
Unfortunately, you just don't see that same type of alignment with Canadian Pacific Kansas City.
但就像Sean刚才提到的,这是一家200年历史的企业。很难获得那种利益一致性。所以,我对管理层的总体看法是,他们擅长自己做的事,我赞赏他们有着非常非常好的沟通和透明度。
But like Sean just mentioned, it's a 200-year-old business. It's very hard to get that kind of alignment. So, you know, my overall take on management is that they are good at what they do, and I give them kudos for having very, very good communication and transparency.
但我真的很希望看到激励机制重新转向更注重资本效率。我认为这会让这套激励结构重新回到A级,而按目前的情况,我大概只会给它B级。
But, you know, I'd really love to see the incentive system tip back to being more capital efficiency focused. I think that this would get this incentive structure back to being an A, whereas today I'd give it more of maybe a B-grade.
所以我希望看到他们在某个时候回到那个状态,那会让我对管理层的激励机制兴奋得多。我也很希望看到一些公开市场买入,这样如果我买入,就知道管理层对这个决定也有信心。
So, I'm hoping to see that they get back to that at some point, which would make me much more excited about management incentive structure. I'd also love to see some maybe open market buys as well to know that if I'm buying that management also has conviction in uh that decision.
那么,你认为什么可能让这个投资逻辑脱轨?双关是故意的。我们说过今天会有一些火车相关的双关。这项业务显然很强劲,但哪里可能出问题呢?
So, what do you think could knock this thesis off the tracks? Pun intended. We told you there there would be some train puns today. The the business is clearly strong, but what could go wrong, right?
这是一项我们都认同难以被颠覆的业务,但外面确实存在竞争。而且很明显,这些企业都在试图从彼此手中抢占市场份额。我能想到的一个可能让它们更脆弱的风险,是行业内可能发生另一起合并,使它们的某个竞争对手成为更重量级的玩家,也就是Union Pacific,至少它已宣布了与Norfolk Southern合并的计划。
It's a business that we agree is is hard to disrupt, but there is competition out there. And it's clear that these businesses are all trying to take market share from each other.
And one risk maybe that I could think of uh that would leave them more vulnerable is is the potential for another merger in the industry that would make one of their competitors more of a heavyweight, which would be Union Pacific. uh and and their at least announced plans to merge with Norfolk Southern.
是的,我认为这对Canadian Pacific Kansas City的利益来说绝对是一个潜在风险,尤其是在美国方面。
Yeah, I think this is definitely a potential risk for Canadian Pacific Kansas City's interest, especially in regards to the United States.
而且由于Canadian Pacific与Kansas City Southern的交易,监管期非常漫长。所以这笔交易要到2027年某个时候才会有监管机构的决定。
And as Canadian Pacific and Kansas City Southern deal, there is a very lengthy regulatory period. So, this deal won't have a decision by regulators until sometime in 2027.
要理解这样一笔交易中的所有细微之处有点复杂,但K and Pacific Kansas City已呼吁监管机构否决这笔交易,你可能不会对此感到意外。
It's a little complicated to understand all the little nuances that go on in a deal like this, but K and Pacific Kansas City has called for regulators to reject the deal, which you probably wouldn't be surprised about.
所以,这归结为这些铁路公司之间往往存在的几种不同合作关系。例如,在一笔合并中,Canadian Pacific Kansas City的横贯大陆布局——我曾说过这是它们最大的竞争优势之一——实际上会面临风险。
So, it comes down to a few different partnerships that these railroads tend to have with each other. For instance, in a merger, Canadian Pacific Kansas City's transcontinental positioning, which I've discussed as being one of their largest competitive advantages, would actually be at risk.
所以,我认为这笔合并无论如何都不会必然扼杀这项业务的投资逻辑。Canadian Pacific, Kansas City仍会有大量业务,但这很可能会给增长故事带来一些损伤。
So, I don't think the merger would necessarily kill the thesis for the business by any means. You know, Canadian Pacific, Kansas City would still have a lot of business, but it probably would put a bit of a dent in the growth story.
这里的另一个重大风险,算是房间里的大象,我们很难不谈,那就是贸易方面。对。7月1日,美国、墨西哥、加拿大协定进行了首次审议。加拿大和墨西哥喜欢现有的协议并希望延长它,但美国选择拒绝这一选项。
And the other big risk here uh that's sort of an elephant in the room be hard for us not to talk about is is on the trade front. Right. On July 1st, the US, Mexico, Canada agreement had its first review.
And Canada and Mexico like the deal that's already in place and want to extend it, but the US chose to decline that option.
这也不全是坏事,幸运的是该协议有效期到2036年——从这里的股东角度来看是幸运的——但它将每年接受审议,这确实意味着美国将对这笔协议拥有一些政治筹码。
And it's not all bad as the deal is fortunately in place until 2036, fortunately from the perspective of uh of shareholders here, but it will be reviewed on an annual basis and that does mean the US is going to have some political leverage over the deal.
而如果国家之间的关系进一步恶化,他们就可以拿这项协议来施压,以争取有利的让步。我认为这很重要,因为Canadian Pacific, Kansas City增长最快的业务板块是汽车、能源和大宗商品等,这些都非常容易受到贸易政策影响,并且很大程度上依赖跨境运输。
And if the relationships between uh nations fray any further, uh they can dangle uh the agreement to try and get favorable concessions. And I think that matters because Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's fastest growing business segment is in things like automotive, energy, and commodities that are very much exposed to trade policy and rely a lot on going across borders.
如果这些国家之间的关税大幅上升、近岸外包放缓,那么Canadian Pacific Kansas City就会成为真正的受害者,并感受到其中的痛苦。
And if tariffs between any of these countries are to go up dramatically and nearshoring slows down, then Canadian Pacific Kansas City is going to be uh a real victim of that and and feel the pain of it.
是的,我认为这是真的。但Canadian Pacific Kansas City实际上确实有几个优势,提供了一点——不是完全的,但一点——保护,我们这里或许应该谈一谈。
Yeah, I think this is true. But there actually are a couple of advantages that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has that offered a little bit, not full, but a little bit of protection that we should probably touch on here.
美国实际上对符合美国、墨西哥、加拿大协定规定的商品予以豁免。所以据我理解,这使得许多这类商品可以在美国境内运输而无需承担这些巨额关税。
So the US actually exempts the United States, Mexico, Canadian agreement compliant goods. So this makes it from my understanding possible to move a lot of these goods across the US without incurring these massive tariffs.
例如,如果加拿大想直接把货物从墨西哥运出,或者反过来,那么这有助于缓解其中一些风险。而运量持续上升这一事实表明,他们仍在通过美国运送越来越多的产品。
If for instance, you know, Canada wanted to move freight directly from Mexico or vice versa, well then that helps mitigate some of these risks. And the fact that volumes are continuing to rise shows that they are still shipping more and more products through the US.
但如果我说这个具体领域不存在大量不确定性,那我就是在撒谎。我在这里要提到的最后一个风险是他们的债务。我想我们前面已经谈得够多了,但这仍然是一个值得提及的风险。
But I'd be lying if I said there wasn't a significant amount of uncertainty in this exact area. The last risk that I'll mention here is in their debt. So, I think we covered that enough earlier, but it's still a risk worth mentioning.
我会想确认他们的杠杆率没有升得过高,而且我肯定会关注他们未来偿还债务费用的难易程度。我们今天对 Canadian Pacific, Kansas City 已经相当苛刻了。所以,让我们看看这项业务的一些亮点,因为是的,它确实有一些亮点。
I'd want to make sure that their leverage ratios aren't moving up too high, and I definitely would be paying attention to how easily they can service their debt expense here into the future.
We've been pretty tough on Canadian Pacific, Kansas City today. So, let's look at some of the bright sides of the business because yes, it it does have some.
谈到 Canadian Pacific, Kansas City,你认为有哪些主要催化剂能帮助这项业务继续增长?
When you consider Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, what are the main catalysts that you think can help make this business continue to grow?
是的。如果你看他们最新的演示材料,他们指引的是低双位数的调整后摊薄每股收益增长。所以,他们显然认为这项业务中存在能帮助他们实现这一目标的增长杠杆。
Yeah. So, if you look at their latest presentation, they guide for low double-digit adjusted diluted EPS growth. So, you know, they clearly think there are growth levers in this business that can help them get there.
北美许多铁路公司的运量在大约二十年间一直相当持平。这次合并帮助 Canadian Pacific, Kansas City 的运量实现了相当幅度的增长。
Many of North America's railroads have had pretty flat volumes for about two decades. The merger helped Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's volume increase by a decent amount.
所以,自合并以来,如果剔除煤炭,按收入吨英里计算,他们的运量增长了22%。这在业内是相当罕见的增长。另一个重要的增长引擎是将卡车货运转化为铁路货运。比如说,墨西哥与美国之间的货运中,很大一部分实际上是卡车货运。
So, since the merger, if you exclude coal, their volumes are up 22% as seen by revenue track miles. That's pretty rare growth in the industry. One other big growth engine is converting truck freight into rail freight.
So much of the freight between, let's say, Mexico and the US is actually truck freight.
所以在2025年,卡车承担了墨西哥运输贸易中约74%的份额。有趣的是,历史最高纪录年份是2024年,但2025年略有下降。
So in 2025, trucks carry about 74% of Mexico's transporter trade. Interestingly, the all-time record year was back in 2024, but 2025 dipped slightly.
现在,我不确定我能否说这完全是因为 Canadian Pacific, Kansas City 现在……但它确实让选择用铁路车厢而非卡车来运送货物变得更容易了。
Now, I'm not sure that I can say that that's purely because Canadian Pacific, Kansas City is, you know, now there u but it's certainly making the decision easier to help ship freight using rail car versus a truck.
所以,他们目前的目标是每年从公路上分流约64,000车卡的货运量,而他们今天已经完成了这一目标的大约40%。
So, they currently aim to divert about 64,000 truck loads away from the highway annually and they are at about 40% of that target today.
所以,这是一个相当不错的杠杆,因为它完全消除了来自铁路行业的竞争。因此,凭借这一优势,他们希望从卡车运输行业夺取市场份额,而卡车运输行业相比铁路要分散得多得多。
So, you know, this is a pretty good lever because it removes competition from the railroad industry entirely. So on this advantage they're looking to take market share from the trucking industry which is much much more fragmented compared to railroads.
而且我知道,我个人更愿意从一个分散的行业夺取市场份额,而不是从一个集中的行业。我认为这完全正确,因为当你从一个分散的行业夺取份额时,另一边的任何一方都不够大,无法以协调一致的方式反击。
而从另一家一级铁路公司夺取份额,则意味着要与一个成本结构和你相同、耐心也和你相同的竞争对手打价格战。
And I know that I personally would prefer to steal market share from a fragmented industry than a consolidated one. I think that's exactly right because when you take share from a fragmented industry nobody on the other side is big enough to fight back in a coordinated way.
Whereas taking share from another class one railroad means picking a price war with a competitor that has the same cost structure and and the same patients that that you do.
而卡车运输是成千上万的小运营商,无论他们怎么做,在长途运输上都无法匹敌铁路的燃料经济性。所以,这确实意味着 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 可以凭借结构性优势取胜,而不仅仅是通过降价。
And trucking is thousands of small operators who who can't match rails fuel economics on a long haul no matter what they do. So that is sure that Canadian Pacific Kansas City can win uh on on structural advantage rather than just by cutting price.
这次合并还开辟了其他一些机会。例如,汽车业务上个季度刚刚增长了19%,这与墨西哥日益成为主要汽车制造中心相吻合。
And the merger has also opened up some other opportunities. For instance, automotive just grew 19% last quarter, and that lines up with Mexico increasingly becoming a major car manufacturing hub.
然后现在,你有粮食从加拿大运往墨西哥,这条路线实际上只有在合并解除了一些阻碍之后才变得经济可行。而煤炭是一个净负面因素。不过值得注意的是,Canadian Pacific, Kansas City 的煤炭主要是来自不列颠哥伦比亚省 Elk Valley 的冶金煤,用于亚洲的炼钢。
And and then now you have grain moving from Canada into Mexico, a route that really only became economical uh once the merger removed some of the the handcuffs standing in the way. and and coal is a net negative.
Although it's worth noting that Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's coal is mostly metallurgical coal out of uh British Columbia's Elk Valley that goes into steel making in Asia.
所以那里真正的风险是钢铁需求,而不是脱碳,而且钢铁需求在短期内降到零的可能性真的很小。对。而且我认为煤炭现在基本上也只占收入很小的一部分了。它大约只占收入的6%,而十年前这个数字接近10%。
So the real risk there is is steel demand more than than decarbonization and it's really unlikely for that to to go to zero anytime soon. Right. And I think coal is also just basically a pretty small part of the revenue now.
So it makes up just about 6% of revenue while a decade ago that number was close to 10%.
所以我不太担心煤炭的衰落会如何长期影响 Canadian Pacific Kansas City。
So I'm not super concerned about how the downfall of coal is going to affect Canadian Pacific Kansas City long term.
除了运量增长之外,还有提升经营杠杆的潜力,因为管理层给出的指引是每股收益增速高于收入增速,而这主要得靠回购和经营杠杆来实现。
And on top of the the volume growth there there's also the potential to improve operating leverage since management has guided for higher earnings per share growth than revenue that mostly has to come from buybacks and operating leverage.
额外的经营杠杆可以来自每列火车运送更多货物。影响这一点的因素包括平均列车速度、平均列车长度、平均列车重量,还有燃油效率。
The additional operating leverage can come from moving more freight per train. And things that affect this are average train speeds and average train links, average train weight and and fuel efficiency as well.
而他们今年在所有这些指标上几乎都取得了改善。唯一不希望这些改善来自的地方,就是以牺牲安全指标为代价,比如人身伤害和列车事故。
And they've improved on really all of these metrics this year. The one place you don't want those gains to come from is at the expense of safety metrics like personal injuries and and train accidents.
是的,这些都是我认为股东肯定必须持续关注的指标。
Yeah, these are all metrics that I think shareholders definitely have to continue to pay attention to.
如果这些指标能继续改善,那么仅仅靠用更少的增量成本运送更多运量,就能获得一个不错的顺风,但他们必须非常持续地提升效率,才能在未来获得这些好处。
If those metrics can continue to be improved, well then there's a nice little tailwind you get simply from just moving more volume with less incremental cost, but they definitely have to improve efficiency on a very consistent basis to get those benefits into the future.
那么,我认为现在到了本期节目该看看你认为 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 值多少钱的时候了。
Well, I think it's that uh time of the episode to look at just what you think Canadian Pacific Kansas City is worth.
那就来吧。在讲内在价值之前,我先给你讲讲我对 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 的总体看法。
Let's do it. So, before I go into the intrinsic value, let me give you kind of my highle view of Canadian Pacific Kansas City.
所以,在我看来,这是一家非常有意思的企业。它有很多似乎很难被颠覆的护城河,而且技术颠覆的风险非常小。所以,通常我会对具备这种格局的企业非常兴奋,但我也认为,要理解这家企业涉及很多变量。
So, in my view, it's a very interesting business. It has lots of moes that seem to be very difficult to disrupt and it has very minimal technological disruption. So, normally I'd be very excited about a business that has this setup, but I also think there's a lot of variables involved with understanding this business.
你需要很了解铁路行业,还需要了解各个参与者之间如何互动,以及为什么它们相对彼此会有这些特定的优势和劣势。除非我对铁路非常热衷,否则这似乎是一个我不太确定自己愿意花太多时间的行业。
You need to know the railroad industry well, and you need to know how each player are interacting and why they're having these specific advantages and disadvantages compared to one another.
And unless I'm very passionate about railroads, this seems like an industry that I'm just not so sure that I want to spend too much time on.
我知道我儿子听到这个会失望,但鉴于这个行业已经如此成熟,我不确定自己是否愿意花太多时间去理解它,原因很简单:我偏好的回报基准很可能远高于我持有这家公认优秀的企业所能获得的回报。
I know my son would be disappointed to hear this, but given how mature the industry is, I'm just not sure it's an industry I feel like I could probably put too much time into understanding simply because my preferred return benchmark is likely a lot higher than the returns that I'm going to get from owning an admittedly great business.
嗯,我认为这很合理。那么,我们来看看你做出的一些假设,判断 Canadian Pacific Kansas City 是否会是一笔不错的投资,因为即使你不喜欢它的增长,只要它足够便宜,仍然可能是一笔不错的投资。
Well, that's I think that's fair enough. So, let's get into some of those assumptions that you're making to figure out if Canadian Pacific, Kansas City would make for a decent investment because even if you don't like the growth, if it's cheap enough, it could still make for a decent investment.
好,那就来吧。在我的基准情形中,我假设未来5年的收入增长率约为6%。
Yeah, let's do it. So, in my base case for revenue growth, I assume about a 6% growth rate over the next 5 years.
这处于管理层高个位数收入目标区间的低端,但我剔除了他们曾有的短期燃油和收获提振等因素,并为并购和贸易风险等留出了空间。
Now, this is on the low end of management's revenue targets in the high single digits, but I'm stripping out things like short-term fuel and harvest boosts that they've had and leaving room for things like merger and trade risks.
所以,我认为他们在利润率方面做得相当不错。而且正如我们刚才讨论的,可能还有一些进一步改善的空间。所以,我采用的是约53%的Ebida利润率,这比当前利润率高出约1.5个百分点。所以,我认为这算不上太大的信仰飞跃。
So, I think they're doing a pretty good job on margins. And as we just discussed, there is probably some room for further improvement. So, I'm using Ebida margins of about 53% which is about a point and a half above the current margins.
So, I don't think this is too much of a leap of faith.
我认为EV/Ebida倍数大概率会略有下降,在终值年份可能达到约14倍。与疫情后几年的水平相比,平均倍数明显偏高。所以我认为,对于这样一家非常高质量的企业,14倍作为基准情形是一个相当扎实的数字。
I think the EV to Ebida multiple probably goes down slightly and reaches maybe 14 times in the terminal year. the average multiple was significantly elevated compared to a few of the postcoid years.
So I think 14 times is a pretty solid number for a base case on you know a very high quality business like this.
基于这些假设,我得出约165美元的价值,包含股息在内的回报率约为7%。我现在正在看你的乐观情形和悲观情形模型。那我们把它们综合起来,看看你算出的内在价值是多少。
So with those assumptions I get a value of about $165 which offers a return of about 7% including dividends. I'm looking at your bull and and barecase model right now. So let's put it all together and and see what your intrinsic value is.
是的。在乐观情形下,我假设墨西哥业务腾飞,Union Pacific与Norfolk Southern的合并被阻止或被附加严格条件,然后我还假设管理层指引的增长能够实现。
Yeah. So with the bull case I assume you know Mexico takes off the Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern merger gets blocked or heavily conditioned and then I also assume that management's guided growth comes to fruition.
在悲观情形下,合并以最低限度的条件获批,与墨西哥的贸易放缓。综合这些,我得出111美元的价值,仍低于今天约122美元的当前股价。
In the bare case the merger goes through with minimal conditions and trade with Mexico slows. With all that I get a value of $111 which is still below the current share price of about $122 today.
既然公司股价正好在内在价值附近,我完全可以接受放弃这家企业。这并不是一家增长潜力特别令人兴奋的企业。有些企业波动很大,潜在上行空间可以大幅提升公司的内在价值。比如Apploven这样的公司,如果一切顺利,就有很大的这种增长潜力。
So with the company's share price being right around intrinsic value I'm perfectly fine taking a pass on this business. It's not a business that has particularly exciting growth potential.
You know, some businesses have a lot of variance and the potential upside can greatly improve the intrinsic value of the company. You know, something like Apploven, for instance, has a lot of that growth potential if everything tends to work out.
但就Canadian Pacific Kansas City而言,我完全可以先在场外观望。也许如果股价跌到90多美元的低位或更低,我可能会觉得这稍微更有意思一些,但我并不急于把它纳入内在价值组合。
But, you know, when it comes to Canadian Pacific Kansas City, I'm just fine waiting on the sidelines here. Perhaps if shares were to get somewhere in the low 90s or below, I could maybe see this getting a little more interesting, but um I'm not really in any uh rush to have this uh in the intrinsic value portfolio.
在放弃这一点上,我和你看法一致。我认为可以这样表述:Canadian Pacific Kansas City是一家优秀的企业,但它的定价也已经体现了这一点,这也是本节目常见的主题。
因此,我们花了大量篇幅赞赏的护城河,已经相当充分地反映在股价中,甚至反映得更多。而且我们还没有看到足够证据表明增长故事真正兑现,因此无法比市场当前给该公司的定价更看多。
I'm there with you on passing. And I think the way to frame it is that Canadian Pacific Kansas City is a great business that is also already priced like one, which is a common theme on this show.
And so the moat that we spent a lot of the episode admiring is pretty much fully reflected, if not more so, uh in the stock. And we haven't seen enough evidence of the growth story really coming to fruition yet to uh be more bullish than the market currently has priced the company.
如果你有一个大约每年7%的基准情形,这根本不足以改变局面。
And you know if you have a base case of roughly 7% a year. Um it just doesn't move the needle for the