$HEI

HEICO 的业务质量优于同行(杠杆更低、管理层利益一致、护城河持久),但随着市场将这一质量计入价格,其面临估值风险。

看涨他说的是几年内
《HEICO Vs. TransDigm: Whose Aerospace Monopoly Is Better?》
The Intrinsic Value Podcast发布 2026-10-03 · 42 段内容
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42 段内容
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所以我们在那次对话中得出结论,Hiko 是比 Trans Nine 更高质量的企业,但我们并没有真正深入探究具体原因是什么。但我承认,我并没有那么详细地研究过 Hiko。

So we concluded in that conversation that Hiko was a higher quality business than trans nine, but we didn't really dig into specifically why that is. But I admittedly have not looked into Hiko with as much detail.

Hiko 的三个知名竞争对手是 General Electric、Pratt and Whitney 和 Rolls-Royce。

three of Hiko name competitors are General Electric, Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce.

只是为了让你了解这个行业有多赚钱。Hiko 和 Transom 也都有非常好的利润率。虽然不如 GE Aerospace 那么高,但仍然非常稳健,Hiko 大约在 18%。

Just to give you an idea of just how profitable the industry is. And both Hiko and Transom has very nice profit margins as well. You know, not quite as high as GE aerospace but still very solid with high Co coming in around 18%

所以这些企业都被称为原始设备制造商,即 OEM。Trans Dime 确实提供用于全新飞机的零部件。所以它们会提供用于发动机的零部件。但 Trans Dime 以及 Hiko 真正出彩的地方,是在售后市场这一块。

So these businesses are all referred to as original equipment manufacturers or OEMs. So Trans Dime does offer parts that do go into brand new aircraft. So they'll offer parts that do go into engines.

But we're trans dime and also Hiko really shine is kind of in this aftermarket section.

但现在让我们来看看 Hiko。它和 Trans Time 并没有太大不同。它们都有有机增长和非有机增长。它们在一生中都进行了大量收购。Hiko 自 1996 年以来进行了 110 多起收购。

But let's now take a look at Hiko. So it's not too dissimilar from trans time. You know they both have organic and non-organic growth. They both made a ton of acquisitions over their lifetime.

Hiko has made more than 110 acquisitions since 1996.

所以 Hiko 也为新飞机的 OEM 制造零部件。但它们也有一个非常大的售后市场部分。如果把 Hiko 的售后零部件销售以及维修和大修零部件服务加在一起,它们的售后市场收入约占其收入的 59%。所以也和 Transdev 相当相似。

So Hiko also makes parts for OEMs for new aircraft. But they have a very large aftermarket component as well. So if you add up Hiko sales of aftermarket parts as well as repair and overhaul part services, they have aftermarket revenue making about 59% of their revenue. So also quite similar to Transdev.

我知道 HEICO 也划分为不同的业务板块。其中有一个叫飞行支持集团(Flight Support Group)的板块,贡献了大部分收入。

And so I know Hiko is broken into different segments as well. And with them, there's a segment called the Flight Support Group that makes up the majority of of revenue.

对,完全正确。截至最近一个季度,飞行支持集团约占收入的 67%。这个板块利用专有技术来设计和制造喷气发动机及飞机的替换零部件,客户包括商用和军用客户。

Yeah, that's completely correct. So as of the latest quarter, the flight support group makes up about 67% of revenue. Now, this segment uses proprietary technology to both design and manufacture jet engine and aircraft replacement components.

So they sell to commercial and military customers.

但正是在这里,他们与 TransDigm 有所不同。HEICO 非常刻意地把价格稳定地定在 OEM 价格以下约 30% 到 50%。

But here's where they kind of separate from trans time. So Hiko is very intentional about setting prices consistently about 30 to 50% below the OEM prices.

但这只是他们竞争优势的起点。其商业模式的另一个关键方面是零部件的监管审批。正如我之前提到的,你不能拿一个便宜的替换件进来,还指望有人真的会买。在美国,联邦航空管理局(FAA)有一个叫零部件制造商批准(Parts Manufacturer Approval)的项目。

HEICO 销售的几乎每一个零部件都专门获得了 FAA 的批准。

But this is only the start of their competitive advantage. So another vital aspect of business model is the regulation of its parts. So as I mentioned earlier, you can't come in with a cheap replacement part and expect anyone to actually buy it from you.

So in the US, the Federal Aviation Administration has a program known as the Parts Manufacturer approval. Nearly every single component that Hiko sells has been approved specifically by the FAA.

所以我认为理解这一点的简单方式是,HEICO 也许就像航空航天行业里的仿制药公司。他们销售的产品在功能上大致等同于原始设备制造商(OEM)的零部件,但价格却低得多。而 FAA 就像是那个决定他们零部件是否达标的监管机构。

So I think the simple way to think about this is that Hiko is like maybe the generic drug company of the aerospace industry. They sell a product that is something like the functional equivalent of the original equipment manufacturers component, but they do so for a really steep discount.

And the FAA is like this governing body that decides whether their components are up to par, basically.

这个审批流程可能需要 2 到 5 年,取决于所涉零部件的复杂程度。对,完全正确。我认为这是个完美的比喻。从中可以看出,所需的时间显然也是这一优势的重要部分。HEICO 很酷的一点是,他们并不直接照抄这些零部件,而是自己进行设计并必须自行完成工程研发。

这或许也解释了为什么他们能够在降低价格的同时,仍然保持非常非常高的利润率。

And then this approval process can take anywhere from 2 to 5 years, depending on the complexity of the part involved. Right, exactly. I think that's the perfect metaphor. And you can get the idea there that the time that it takes is obviously a big part of the advantage as well.

So the cool part about Hiko is that they don't outright copy the parts. They actually are designing it and having to engineer it themselves as well. And this probably explains why they're able to reduce the price on it while still making some very, very high margins.

第二块业务叫电子技术集团(Electronic Technologies Group)。这部分业务更多涉及利基电子产品,比如用于军事瞄准系统的激光测距仪,或者收发无线电信号的放大器和天线,乃至备用电源甚至电源转换套件。

他们销售非常广泛的电子元件,这部分业务约占其收入的其余 33% 左右。

So the second part of business is called the Electronic Technologies Group. This part of the business deals more with things like niche electronics. Think of devices like laser rangefinders used in military targeting systems, or amplifiers and antennas that send and receive radio signals all the way to backup power supplies or even power conversion kits.

They sell a very wide range of electrical components, and this part of the business accounts for the remaining 33% or so of its revenues.

这两个板块都有庞大的售后零部件业务,但据我所能了解到的,飞行支持集团在售后销售方面提供的业务远多于电子技术集团。

Both of the segments have a large aftermarket parts business, but from what I can gather, the flight safety group offers much more in aftermarket sales compared to the electronic technology group.

正因为如此,这样的收入流非常非常可靠。对 TransDigm 来说,这支持了它能够承担更多杠杆。但再次比较两者时,HEICO 的杠杆要低得多。

And because of this, it's such a revenue. Streams are very much very reliable. And for Kassel, which supports them being able to carry more leverage. But again, when you compare the two, just simply Heiko is much less leveraged.

与 HEICO 对比一下,诚然 HEICO 比 TransDigm 小得多,他们只有 23 亿美元的净债务,净杠杆率约为 1.6 倍。

And just to contrast that with Hiko, which is admittedly a much smaller company than trans lime, they only have $2.3 billion in net debt and a net leverage ratio around 1.6 times.

我认为关于债务状况,这大概就是你需要知道的全部了。再次说明,从某些角度看,HEICO 显然处于安全得多的位置。

I think that's really all you you probably need to know, right when it comes to the debt situation. Again, it's just clear that Hiko is in a much safer position from some perspectives.

由于 FAA 的监管,HEICO 显然处于极其有利的位置,它是某些零部件的少数制造商之一。但他们都承认,对于他们开发的许多零部件,OEM 往往仍是唯一的供应来源。所以从技术上讲,即便他们拥有以极低折扣销售这些零部件的优势,来自 OEM 的至少一个竞争对手始终存在。

Hiko is obviously incredibly well positioned due to the FAA regulations, as you know, one of the few manufacturers of certain parts. But they all admit that the OEM is often the sole source for many of the parts that they developed.

So, you know, technically, they'll always have at least one competitor there from the OEMs, even if they have that advantage of selling those components that a very, very steep discount.

那么我想,对于关注这场对话的篮球迷来说,HEICO 更像是勒布朗,因为他们通过让身边的人变得更好来取胜。在这个例子里,就是为客户省钱。而且它也是为长久而打造的。勒布朗至今仍在打球,职业生涯极其漫长。

所以投资者面临的问题是,你想要乔丹那种杀手本能,还是勒布朗那种持久力。就我个人而言,作为投资者,我大概会选择勒布朗式的做法,因为它对我更有吸引力。

And then I guess Hiko is is more like LeBron for our basketball fans out there that are following along with the conversation because they win by making people around them better.

And in this case, that's by saving customers and money. And it's also built for longevity, right. LeBron is still playing to this day. It's incredibly long career. So the question for investors is whether you want that that killer instinct of Jordan or the staying power of of maybe LeBron.

And I would probably take personally the LeBron approach for business as being more attractive to me as an investor.

对,如果要简化来说,我认为 HEICO 和 TransDigm 都提供了很高的转换成本。所以大体上,转换要么不可能,要么在经济上不可行。当然,OEM 可以对客户使用非自家的售后零部件发难,但如果他们将来还想要这个客户的生意,基本上就只能接受客户会使用来自另一家公司的售后零部件,因为客户能以好得多的价格买到这些零部件,同时性能基本相同。

Yeah, I think if I had to simplify it, I think both Hiko and Trans Time offer high switching costs. So, you know, for the most part, switching is either impossible or economically unfeasible.

Sure, the OEMs can make a stink about a customer maybe using these aftermarket parts that aren't their own, but you know, if they want the customers business again in the future, they basically have to just accept that the customer is going to use aftermarket parts from a different company because they can get them simply at a much better price, while delivering essentially the exact same performance.

这与他们发生的那两起坠机事故无关,但 FAA 基本上得出结论,受影响的零部件可能因制造工艺不当而容易出现过早失效或裂纹。虽然前缘缝翼滑轨完全失效不会导致飞机失事,但仍存在失效零部件在飞行中导致飞机受损的风险。

我们无从得知这些零部件来自哪里,只知道它是一家波音的分级供应商。所以任何有这样声誉的企业,未来在排序中可能都会低得多,相比之下,像 HEICO 这样以在其整个生命周期内从未有任何零部件失效而自豪的企业则不然。

Now, this was unrelated to the two crashes that they had, but the FAA basically concluded that the affected parts may be susceptible to premature failure or cracks resulting from improper manufacturing process.

Although a complete failure of a leading edge slat track could not result in the loss of the aircraft, a risk remains that failed parts could lead to aircraft damage in flight.

Now we have no idea of knowing where these parts came from, other than that it was a sub tier supplier for Boeing. So any business that has a reputation like this probably is going to be a lot lower in the pecking order in the future versus a business such as Hiko, which prides itself on never having any parts failed during their entire lifespan.

而对 HEICO 来说,失败的高昂代价实际上是它必须先跨过的障碍,因此它必须一次一个 FAA 批准地赢得信任,成为原始设备制造商的可信替代选择。但一旦做到,这些同样的壁垒就开始对它有利,因为任何想以低价抢 HEICO 生意的人,现在都得撞上同一堵怀疑和审查的高墙。

所以 TransDigm 是默认受益于这些壁垒,而 HEICO 则算是靠自己一步步赢得了进入壁垒之内的资格。在我看来,这让这家企业的地位更加稳固。

Whereas for Hiko, the high cost of failure was actually the hurdle it had to clear first, and so it had to earn trust as a credible alternative to the original equipment manufacturer.

1FA approval at a time. But once it did, those same barriers started working in its favor because anyone trying to undercut Hiko, well, now they have to run into that same wall of of skepticism and review.

So transform benefits from these barriers by default. Well, Hiko sort of earned its way inside of them. And to me that makes the businesses position more durable.

这真的很重要。就像你刚说的,HEICO 基本上是靠自己一步步打进去的。他们做到这一点的方式之一,基本上就是与汉莎航空合作。自那以后,他们也与其他多家航空公司建立了类似合作。所以我认为他们在从零开始建立自己的客户忠诚度方面做得非常非常出色,这我认为非常值得称赞。

It's really important. Like you just said, that Hiko essentially worked their way into that. And one of the ways they did that was basically by partnering with Lufthansa. So and since that time, they've done that with a multiple other airlines as well.

So I think they've done a really, really good job of building their own loyalty kind of from scratch, which is I think very, very commendable.

首先来看看管理层。HEICO 过去是、现在仍然主要是一家家族经营的企业。Lawrence(拉里)·门德尔森去年去世了,但他在去世前一直担任公司执行董事长,享年约 87 岁。不过,他的遗产由他的两个儿子 Eric 和 Victor Mendelson 延续。

兄弟俩自 1990 年起就加入 HEICO,两人在沿公司阶梯晋升的过程中担任过多个不同职务,如今他们是联席 CEO,并分别掌管飞行支持集团和电子技术集团。

So first let's get to management here. Heiko was and still is primarily a family run business. Lawrence or Larry Mendelson passed away last year, but he was still the company's executive chairman until he passed away at the age of about 87.

His legacy, however, lives on in his two sons, Eric and Victor Mendelson. So the brothers have been part of Heiko since 1990, and both have worked in a number of different roles as they moved up the corporate ladder, where they are now co-CEOs, and the heads of the Flight Support Group and the Electronics Technologies Group.

我们所知道的是,家族经营的企业往往比非家族经营的企业提供更高的回报,这一点我在很多研究中都看到过,也有大量数据支持这一观点。我认为这背后有多个原因。基本上,首先他们投入的切身利益更多,这有助于他们做出更长期的投资决策。

And so what we know is that family run businesses do tend to offer higher returns than non-family run firms, and it's something I've seen a lot of studies on, and there's a lot of data backing up that point.

And I think there are multiple reasons for this. And basically they have more skin in the game for one, and that helps them make longer term investment decisions.

这很可能也让他们更不愿意承担投机性债务,总体上提高了他们的风险厌恶程度。这使得他们的企业能够在更少中断的情况下实现复利增长。

And that also probably makes them more hesitant to take on speculative debt and just generally increases their risk aversion. That leads to the to be able to to have their businesses compound with less interruption.

你可以在 Heiko 和 transom 的对比中直接看到这一点。Heiko 的内部人士持有公司近 19% 的股票,这与其他所有股东形成了很强的利益一致性,因为内部人士同时也是公司最大的股东,而仅 Mendelssohn 家族一家就持有其中的绝大部分。

And so you can see this directly in the Heiko and transom comparison. Heiko insiders own nearly 19% of the company's stock, and that provides a lot of alignment with shareholders, all the other shareholders, since insiders are also the largest shareholders of the company, and the Mendelssohn family alone owns the lion's share of that sake.

我真的很喜欢看到这种内部人士持股的动态。是的,我也是。而在我看来,这真的只是高激励计划中值得喜爱之处的开始。Heiko 把所有员工都视为团队成员。因此,他们从一开始就努力在公司内部创造尽可能多的利益一致性。

我认为他们知道团队成员对整个企业成功有多么重要,因此他们帮助资助团队成员的 401,以在仅限高管和董事之外进一步提高一致性。

And so I just I really love seeing that kind of insider ownership dynamic. Yeah. Me too. And that's really just the start of what's to love in my view, of high incentive program.

So Heiko considers all employees to be team members. And as such, they've tried to create as much alignment inside the company as possible right from the beginning. I think they knew how important their team members are to the success of the entire business, and therefore they've helped fund the team members 401 to improve alignment even more outside of just the executive and directors.

但我认为 Heiko 真正真正出彩的地方在于激励结构。所以尽管我们喜欢吐槽 EBITDA,但它确实是他们用来评判业绩的三项指标之一。所以你可能会想,这很不幸,但他们也关注诸如 Heiko 的净利润以及经营活动现金流之类的指标。

But what I think Heiko really, really shines is in the incentive structure. So even though we like to dunk on EBITDA, it is part of the three metrics that they do use to judge performance.

So you may think, well, that's unfortunate, but they also focus on things like net income to Heiko as well as cash flow from operations.

所以对于 2025 年,目标奖金要求这三项财务指标每项都增长约 10% 才能解锁奖金。看到一家企业关注这些指标,而不是你经常在营收增长之类的地方看到的虚荣指标,真的很令人欣慰。

我认为这创造了非常好的利益一致性,因为如果这三项指标都至少增长 10%,那么股价上涨的可能性非常非常大,尤其是如果你把这个数字在多年间复利计算的话,而他们在自己的经营历史上做得异常出色。

So for 2025, the target bonus required about 10% growth in each of these three financial metrics to unlock the bonus. Now, it's really nice to see a business focus on these metrics over just, you know, vanity metrics that you see very often in something like revenue growth.

And I think it creates really good alignment, because if these three metrics are increasing by at least 10%, chances are very, very good that the share price will be up, especially if you compound that number over multiple years, which they've done exceptionally well over their operating history.

我认为它的利益一致性非常好,而我最喜欢的一点是,这三项指标必须共同增长。EBITDA 本身是一个可以被粉饰和操纵的数字,这就是它理应受到一些批评的原因。但要在净利润和经营现金流上同时伪造增长就难得多。

I think it is very well aligned, and what I like most is that all three metrics have to grow together. EBITDA on its own is a number that that can be dressed up and manipulated, and that's why it deserves some criticism.

But it's a lot harder to fake growth in net income and operating cash flow at the same time.

所以管理层不能仅仅通过堆积债务来购买增长就拿到奖金。而这三项指标在近二十年里都以每年大约 15% 到 18% 的速度复利增长,这真的令人难以置信。因此 10% 的门槛率是一个现实的标准,但随着公司规模扩大,这个标准会越来越难跨越,这是大数定律的社会现实。

So management can't hit its bonus just by piling on debt to to buy growth. And all three metrics have compounded at roughly 15 to 18% a year for almost two decades, which really is incredible.

And so a 10% hurdle rate is a realistic bar, but one that gets harder to clear as the company grows as social reality of the law of large numbers.

我也喜欢这种利益一致性并不止于高管层。帮助资助团队成员的 401 让每天制造和修理这些零件的人有了真正像所有者一样思考的理由。再加上 Mendelssohn 家族持有公司如此大的一部分股份,你就得到了这样一种格局:管理层主要在股东也获益时才获得报酬。

And so. I also like that the alignment doesn't stop at the executive suite either. Helping fund team members 401 S gives the people building and repairing these parts every day a real reason to to think like owners.

And you pair that with the Mendelssohn family owning such a big chunk of the company, and you have a setup where management mostly gets paid when shareholders to to.

但我们应该提到,Heiko 在资本配置上的做法与 trans Simon 略有不同,尤其是在股息方面。确实如此,但我在评估这一点时其实有一个相当大的意外发现。如果你看 Heiko 的披露文件,他们在那里明确表示他们确实支付半年度的现金股息。

而且他们已经这样做了很长时间,实际上早在 Mendelssohn 家族接管公司之前就开始了。但股息非常非常小,只有 0.1%。

But we should mention that Heiko does approach capital allocation a bit differently from trans Simon, especially on the dividend front. They do, but I actually had a pretty big surprise when assessing this.

So if you look at Heiko disclosures, they state right there that they do pay a semiannual cash dividend. And they've been doing this for a long time since actually before the Mendelssohn's even took over the company.

But the dividend is very, very small at only 0.1%.

作为一个 serial choirs 的欣赏者,我确实更希望这个数字尽可能接近零。这仅仅是因为 zero choirs 的固有商业模式就是把资本配置到新的收购中,而且我更希望这些资本被投入使用,而不是仅仅用来支付股息。

但当你阅读披露文件时,他们告诉你他们不支付定期股息,但多年来他们进行了一些非常丰厚的特别股息支付。

So me being an admirer of serial choirs, I do prefer having this number as close to zero as possible. And that's simply because the inherent business model of zero choirs is really to just allocate capital into new acquisitions, and rather that capital be put to work rather than just, you know, paying a dividend.

But when you read disclosures, they tell you that they do not pay a regular dividend, but they have made some very hefty special dividend payments over the years.

这真的不言而喻,但我还是要说出来。这两家公司都拥有顶尖的管理团队,而我必须把优势给其中一家。我可能还是会把它给 Heiko。我认为拥有能带来最小稀释、同时又与……良好一致的奖金。

Well, it really goes without saying, but I'm going to say it anyways. Both of these companies have top notch management teams, and I had to give the edge to one. I probably again would would give it to Heiko.

I think having bonuses that cause minimal dilution and are also well aligned with.

股东价值对一个价值投资者来说非常悦耳,而我认为 Heiko 让这三项指标同步上升的计划,应该能确保这家企业在未来许多年里继续以十几的中段速度复利增长。而对我来说的另一部分,是每个团队如何看待时间。

在 Heiko,正如我们提到的,内部人士持有公司近 19% 的股份,而 Mendelssohn 家族已经经营这家企业超过三十年。

Shareholder value is is very much music to my ears as a value investor, and I think hikers plan to get those three metrics to rise and lockstep should ensure the business continues to compound at a mid-teens rate for many years to come.

And the other piece of this for me, is how each team thinks about time. And so at Heiko, as we've mentioned, insiders own close to 19% of the company, and the Mendelssohn family has been running the business for more than three decades.

所以他们实际上是在为下一代管理自己的财富,这是一个相当强大的激励因素。

So they're effectively managing their own wealth for the next generation, which is a pretty powerful motivating factor.

现在,就在这里做个总结,我想和你一样,我在这里再次把优势给 Tycho。但这里的优势比我最初以为的要小得多,也许只有一张纸那么大。

Now, just to wrap things up here, I think similar to you, I'll give the edge here once again, Tycho. But the edge here is a lot smaller than I initially thought, maybe about the size of a piece of paper.

我认为,鉴于 Hiko 没有激进的定价,它把其组件定价在 OEM 之下,主动帮助促成某种竞争,这无疑有助于让 Hiko 远离监管机构的准星。

And I think given the fact that Hiko doesn't have aggressive pricing, it prices its components below the OEMs, actively helps force some sort of competition, which definitely helps keep Hiko outside of the regulator's crosshairs.

所以如果我在评估这两家企业并衡量风险,我认为再一次,我可能会把优势给 Hiko,因为杠杆问题对他们来说似乎并不太令人担忧。而且就 Hiko 而言,交易被阻止的风险也低得多。但我要说,我认为这两家企业承担的风险都相当低。我在这里真的只是在吹毛求疵。

So if I'm looking at both of these businesses and assessing risk, I think once again, I'd probably give the edge to Hiko as the leverage issue just doesn't seem to be much of a concern for them.

And then also having the risk of having deals blocked is also much lower, I think, when it comes to Hiko. But I will say I think both these businesses carry pretty low risk. I'm really just nitpicking here.

是的,我同意,我发现自己更倾向于 hikes 的商业模式,并认为它的风险更小。但我要补充的一个警告是,对于 Hiko 来说,更大的风险是你在股票市场上支付的价格。市场已经知道它有多好。我们稍后会更多地谈到这一点。

Yeah, I agree, I, I think I'm finding myself to to favor hikes business model and seeing it coming with with less risk. But the one caveat I'd add is that with Hiko the bigger risk is is the price you pay in the stock markets.

And so the market already knows how good it is. And we'll get to more of that shortly.

这个频道对 $HEI 的历次判断

The Intrinsic Value Podcast 在这只股票上只有这一条判断。

2026-10-03看涨本条
所以我们在那次对话中得出结论,Hiko 是比 Trans Nine 更高质量的企业,但我们并没有真正深入探究具体原因是什么。
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