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$SE · The Intrinsic Value Podcast · 2026-11-07

AI 摘要 · The Intrinsic Value Podcast

我持有Sea,认为其基本面持续表现良好;南美电商市场足够容纳两三家玩家,Shopee在巴西超越Mercado Libre并非我的基准或乐观情形。我怀疑Shopee的履约网络能否超越MELI,并预计巴西贷款违约率将继续攀升。

看涨他说的是几年内
《Mercado Libre ($MELI): We Doubled Down on Meli!》
The Intrinsic Value Podcast发布 2026-11-07 · 34 段内容
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34 段内容
20:3256:59

你想看 Caspy 的支付交易量,就在那里。我知道,是因为我们为关于 Uber 和 Caspie 的播客提取了这些指标。

You want to see Caspy's payment volumes, it's there. And I know because we pulled these metrics for our podcasts on Uber and Caspie.

我认为我们在这一点上已经达成一致。那么,让我问问你关于竞争方面的问题。我的意思是,正如我们谈到的,你也持有 C Limited,而且我认为你相信,作为 C Limited 子公司的 Shopppee 也能在巴西和南美的扩张中取得成功。

>> Well, I think we're agreed on that. So, let me ask you about just the competitive front. I mean you also own C Limited as we talked about and I take it to you believe that Shopppee which is the subsidiary of C Limited can be successful in its expansion in Brazil and South America too.

是这样吗?再说一次,我以每股7美元左右买入了 C。所以当时我认为它只是一只极其便宜的股票。所以我不认为你需要巴西成功到他们真的会取代 Melly 成为第一的程度。我认为这绝对不是我的基准情景。

这实际上也不是我对 C Limited 或 Shopppee 的乐观情景,至少在巴西不是。

(21:57) Is that right? Well again I bought C in the7s per share. So I thought at that point it was just an incredibly cheap stock. So I don't think you need Brazil to succeed in a way that they would actually replace Melly as the number one.

I think that's definitely not my base case. It's not actually my bullcase for C limited or shopppee at least not in Brazil.

所以好处是,我这么说有点开玩笑,这对我来说也是一种情绪对冲,因为 Mellie 的仓位要大得多。所以虽然我希望 C 表现好,但如果它表现不好,至少是在巴西,那意味着至少有一个竞争对手在苦苦挣扎。

So the good thing is I'm saying this somewhat jokingly that this is also an emotional hedge for me where Mellie is a much larger position. So while I want C to perform well if it doesn't at least in Brazil that means at least a competitor struggling.

所以玩笑归玩笑,我觉得 C Limited 在基本面上持续表现良好,而且我确实相信南美电商市场,正如我们在最初的推介中所说,很可能足够大,能容纳两三个玩家。

So jokes aside I I feel like C Limited keeps performing well fundamentally and I do believe that the South American e-commerce market and this is what we said in our original pitch is probably big enough for two or three players.

所以对于错过我们那期 C Limited 节目的人来说,简短版本是 C Limited 有三项业务。他们有 Garina,这是一家游戏公司,有一个非常火爆的游戏叫 Freefire,那是一款常青游戏,是他们的现金引擎,也是他们扩展到不同全球市场的引擎。

然后是 Shopppee,正如你刚才提到的,这是 C Limited 的电商市场,在东南亚尤其占主导地位,但也成功扩展到了巴西。然后还有 money,这是他们的金融科技部门。所以他们基本上在巴西的电商、金融科技以及借贷领域与 Melly 竞争。

So for anyone who missed our C limited episode that we also did, the short version is C Limited has three businesses. So they have Garina which is a gaming company and they have this one massive hit which is called Freefire and that's an evergreen game that is their cash engine and also their engine to expanding into different and global markets.

Then you have Shopppee which as you just alluded to is the e-commerce marketplace of C Limited which is especially dominant in Southeast Asia but it has also expanded successfully into Brazil.

And then you have money which is their fintech arm. So they basically compete with Melly in Brazil in e-commerce fintech and also in lending.

真正令人印象深刻的是,他们在短短几年内就在巴西建立了庞大的物流业务和配送网络。自从 Amazon 以来,我们一直相信物流是一个巨大的护城河。但 C 确实证明了,嘿,凭借完美的执行和一些投资,它实际上可以比大多数人想象的更快地被重建和复制。

>> The really impressive part is that they built a substantial logistics business and delivery network in Brazil in just a couple of years. And since Amazon, we've always had this belief that logistics is a huge moat.

But C really showed that hey with perfect execution and some investment, it can actually be recreated and copied much faster than most people would have thought possible.

Shopppee 绝对超出了我几年前对它的所有预期。而且,正如我所说,你并没有像 NDS 那样的基础设施。所以基本上,你预期这个护城河对我来说会更大,因为他们必须自己建立物流。

而现在有一个玩家进来,使用大量第三方,基本上自己创造了相当不错的体验。

(25:24) A shopppee definitely outperformed all the expectations I had for them just a couple of years ago. Also, as I said, you didn't have the same infrastructure as NDS. So basically, you expected the mode to be an even bigger one for me because they had to build the logistics all by themselves.

And now you had a player coming in that is using a lot of third parties and is basically creating a pretty good experience itself.

而且很难想象两者如何共存而不持续对彼此构成威胁。我听到很多 Mele 董事会某种程度上忽视 Shopppee 作为一个主要面向低端市场的玩家,因为 Mellie 的 GMV 占主导地位。

你知道,Mellie 的 GMV 仍然比 Shopppee 的 GMV 高出约两倍半,尽管 Shopppee 在巴西的总售出商品数量上现在已经持平甚至略领先。

And it's not easy to imagine how the two would coexist without constantly being a threat for each other. I hear a lot of mele boards somewhat neglecting Shopppee as a player for mainly the lower end of the market because of Mellie's GMV dominance.

You know, Mellie's GMV is still about two and a half times higher than Shopppee's GMV despite Shopppee now being on par and even slightly ahead when it comes to the total amount of items sold in Brazil.

而且我不认为你可以把 Shopppee 视为低端商业场所。我认为他们已经成功地通过所谓的 shopppee mall 在其他市场扩展到高端产品,这基本上就是他们与各行业高质量品牌合作的地方,而且 shopppee mall 在第一季度增长了一倍多,现在约占 Shopppee 巴西 GMV 的15%,这显然也帮助提高了其在巴西的平均订单价值,Shopppee 现在与巴西主要电子产品经销商达成交易,在其网站上提供更多电子产品,正如我们与我们在电商领域关注的其他一些公司所讨论的那样,这是一个典型的产品。这是吸引更高质量客户的关键产品。

And I don't think you can view Shopppee as a low-end commerce place. I think they have already been successful at expanding into higherend products in other markets through what they call shopppee mall and that's basically where they partner with these highquality brands in all kinds of industries and shopppee mall has more than doubled in the first quarter and is now about 15% of shopppee's Brazilian GMV and that obviously helped increase its average order value in Brazil too where Shopppee now signs deals with major electronic dealers in Brazil to (26:34) offer more electronics on its site which is a typical product as we also discussed with some of these other companies that we looked at in the e-commerce space.

It's a critical product to attract higher quality customers.

就像 Macado Libra 一样,在巴西卫生监管机构解除2022年的禁令后,Shopppee 也扩展到了药房业务,所以持牌者现在可以在 Shopee 和 Maui 等平台上销售药品。

And just like Macado Libra, Shopppee expanded into pharmacy after Brazil's health regulator lifted a 2022 ban so licensed can now sell medicines on platforms like Shopee and Maui.

但 Shopppee 本身推出了一个名为 Shopppee VIP 的忠诚度计划,定价正好是 Melliey 基础档的价格,但对超过10雷亚尔的订单提供免费送货,而 Melliey 的免费送货从19雷亚尔开始。

作为参考,10雷亚尔的兑换率约为2美元。所以是5:1的比例。这是一个相当有吸引力的优惠,这就是为什么它在过去六个月里已经获得了一百万用户。

But uh Shopppee in its own right launched a loyalty program called Shopppee VIP and it's priced at exactly the price of Melliey's basic tier, but it offers free shipping on orders above 10 ryes while Melliey's free shipping starts at 19 ryes.

(27:24) (27:25) And so for context, 10 ryes conversion rate on that is about $2 US. So, it's a 5:1 ratio. And that's a pretty attractive offering, which is why it has already gained a million users in just the last six months.

所以我预计差距在未来仍将相当显著。我不太担心。如果差距显著缩小,我会感到惊讶,但平均订单价值对我来说至少是一个重要的指标,我跟踪它来看 Shopee 是否会在巴西的高端客户中获得显著份额,或者更准确地说,未来客户是否会选择 Shopee 进行这些购买,因为许多客户已经在使用两个应用。

(27:50) So, I expect the gap to remain pretty material going forward. I'm not too worried about it. I would be surprised if it closes meaningfully, but average order value is an important metric for me at least that I track to see whether Shopee will gain significant share among higherend customers in Brazil or better said whether customers will choose Shopee for those purchases in the future because many customers are already using both apps.

说未来客户是否会选择 Shopee 进行这些购买,因为许多客户已经在使用两个应用。所以他们使用 Melly 和 Shopee,Melly 通常用于高质量和高信任度的产品,Shopee 用于较低端市场。

但再次强调,我不认为 Shopppee 在巴西的整个存在都必须如此。

said whether customers will choose Shopee for those purchases in the future because many customers are already using both apps. (28:13) So they use Melly and they use Shopee and then Melly usually for the high quality and the high trust products and Shopee for the lower of the market.

But again, I don't think that's where Shopppee has to be for the entirety of their presence in Brazil.

然后是某种创新者的窘境,Shopppee 可以从低端开始,慢慢建立规模,然后向上移动市场,以更好地挑战 Marcato Libre。

and then sort of the innovator's dilemma where Shopppee can start on the low end and slowly build scale and move up market to better (28:41) challenge Marcato Libre.

这绝对在起作用。我的意思是,去年巴西电商市场估计约为1000亿,Melly 在该市场占有约43%的份额,Shopppee 有18%,而且两者实际上都增长了三个百分点。Choppies 正在从 Melly 手中夺取份额,但主要是从传统现有企业手中夺取,就像 Melly 一样,而这些企业表现得很差。

It's definitely working. I mean, the Brazilian e-commerce market was estimated to be about hundred billion last year and Melly has about 43% share in that market and Shopppee has 18% and both actually grew three percentage points.

Choppies are taking share from Melly but mostly from legacy incumbents just like Melly is and they're not doing well at all.

所以一年前,Shopppee 在巴西的月活跃应用用户数就超过了 Melly,约为1.2亿,而 Mellie 为1.5亿。

So Shopppee had more monthly active app users in Brazil than Melly just a year ago which was about 120 million compared to Mellie's 150 million.

所以这就是为什么我们也要留意 money,拼写为 m o n e。这是 C Limited 的另一个子公司。如果 money 从 Marcato Pago 手中夺取份额,我认为那将是另一个警告信号。

And so that's why it's also important for us to watch out for money spelled m o n e. And that is another subsidiary of C Limited. And if money were to grab share from Marcato Pago, I think that would be another warning sign.

当然。但我认为那是另一个巨大的市场,从技术上讲,两者可以在一段时间内共存。话虽如此,我可能还是会觉得 money 抢占份额的问题比 Shopee 更严重,因为这会让我更难坚持护城河理论,因为如今一个巨大的差异化优势就是人们可以去 Shopee 购买其中一些商品。

>> Definitely. But I think that's another huge market where technically both can coexist for a while. (32:06) That said, I would probably see money gaining shares even more of a problem than Shopppee just because it would make the entrenchment theory much more difficult for me because by now a huge differentiator is that people can go to Shopee to buy some of these products.

幸运的是,就目前而言,C Limited 的金融业务甚至还远谈不上能与 Pago 或 Credito 匹敌。因此,Shopee 尚未在巴西推出信用卡,尽管他们已经获得了相关牌照。

其主要信贷产品仍然是 Shopee pay later,也就是结账时的先买后付产品,约占其巴西商品交易总额的 10%。

Fortunately, for the time being, C Limited's money business is not really even close to rivaling Pago or Credito. And so, Shopppee hasn't launched a credit card in Brazil, even though they have the license to do so.

And its main credit product is still the Shopppee pay later, sort of the buy now pay later at checkout product, which accounts for about 10% of its Brazilian gross merchandise value.

这些贷款的平均期限约为 3 个月,月利率接近 10%。我们也开始看到逾期率有所上升。上次你说,如果 C 能将其不良贷款保持在总贷款的 1%,你会非常惊讶。因此,C 全集团范围的 90 天不良贷款率目前仍为 1%。

但具体到巴西,持有 Shopee 贷款的基金显示,90 天逾期率在一年多的时间里已升至约 3%。

And those loans have an average term of about 3 months and carry interest of almost 10% a month. And we're also starting to see delinquencies tick up. Last time you said you'd be very surprised if C could hold its non-performing loans at 1% of their total.

And so C's groupwide 90-day number is still 1% for now. But in Brazil specifically, the funds that hold Shoppee's loans show 90-day delinquencies up to about 3% in a little over a year.

他们越是扩大贷款规模,尤其是扩展到先买后付以外的类别,我们就越应该预期这个数字会上升。我相当确信这一趋势会持续。归根结底,这更多是一个机制性问题。贷款规模增长得如此之快,就像 Mali 一样,以至于一些坏账尚未被计入 90 天数据。因此存在时间滞后。

And the more they expand that loan book, especially into categories outside of buy now, pay later, the more we should expect that number to go up. I'm pretty confident the trend will continue.

And it's more of a mechanical thing in the end. So, the loan book is growing so fast, just as it is for Mali, that some bet loans are simply not yet accounted for in the 90-day number. So, there's a time lag.

再一次说明,从贷款实际变坏到它显现出来之间存在时间差,而且 C 不像 Melly 那样披露 15 至 90 天的不良贷款率。所以在 90 天之前、在我们真正拿到新数字之前,你看不到这个数字上升。

我们应该再次强调,官方口径下 money 的不良贷款率仍为 1%,而不是 3%。

(33:41) once again between when they actually go bad and then when it shows up and C doesn't disclose 15 to 90day NPLs as Melly does. So you don't see that number going up anytime before the 90 days where we actually get the new number.

And we should emphasize again officially the NPLs of money are still at 1% not 3%.

但 money 总体上仍然更像一个数字钱包,而 Pago 显然已经发展得远不止于此。所以这就是为什么 money 在巴西估计只有 100 万至 200 万活跃信贷用户,而 Melly 有超过 2200 万。

But money is generally still more of a digital wallet whereas Pago has obviously evolved into much more than that. So that's why money has only an estimated 1 to2 million active credit users in Brazil whereas Melly has more than 22 million.

关于 C 的物流网络与 Melly 相比,你有什么最新消息吗?因为我听说 SE 大幅扩大了覆盖范围,今年年初大约有 16 个配送中心,但在过去 12 个月里又建了 10 个,其中 5 个是履约中心。

>> Do you have any updates on C's logistics network compared to Melly? Because I heard that SE had expanded its footprint quite significantly and they had something like 16 distribution centers at the start of this year but built another 10 in the last 12 months and five of those are fulfillment centers.

这些大致都对吗?这如何界定这里的竞争格局?没错。我们应该说明,这显然指的是巴西的 Justin,C 的首席财务官表示,目标是最终在绝对规模上拥有比竞争对手更大的履约网络。显然他在这里指的是 Melly,他还说这可能需要几年时间。

(34:31) Is that all sort of right and how does that frame the competition here? That's correct. And we should clarify that's Justin Brazil obviously and the C CFO said the goal is to eventually have a bigger fulfillment network than its competitors in absolute volume.

Obviously he's talking about Melly in that term and he said that might take a few years.

我怀疑他们能否做到,但这无疑意味着他们并不打算停止花钱。Melly 每月支付约近 1 亿雷亚尔的租金。Shopee 约为 3300 万。因此 Melly 的网络规模仍大约是 Shopee 的 2.5 到 3 倍。

而 Melly 仅今年一年就将在巴西再投入 570 亿,包括 14 个新的履约中心,这就是为什么我说我看不到差距在短期内缩小。

(34:49) I doubt they will get there but it definitely means they're not planning on stopping spending money. (35:06) So Melly pays about almost 100 million ryes a month in rent.

Shopppee about 33 million. So Mellie's network is still roughly 2 and 1/2 to three times bigger than Shoppies. And Melly will spend another 57 billion in Brazil this year alone, including 14 new fulfillment centers, which is why I'm saying I don't see the gap closing anytime soon.

而 Shopee 的配送部门则负责其大部分订单,但它确实会众包司机,其 4 小时服务基本上是通过这些合作门店来完成的。

And so Shopppee's delivery arm on the other handles most of its orders, but it does crowdsource drivers and its 4-hour service runs through basically these partner stores.

你实际上可以让数亿人通过社交媒体找到门路,这显然让从零开始催生电商业务变得更容易,尤其是当配送基础设施已经有效到位时——我得说,在南美这只是部分到位。

(43:53) you can actually have hundreds of millions of people find their way through social media, which clearly makes it easier to spawn an e-commerce business out of nothing, especially when that delivery infrastructure is already effectively in place, which I should say is only partly the case in South America.

以及像 Shopee 这样面向低端市场的参与者。但我们没有看到价格战发生,双方都没有真正大幅削减抽成率。而实际上,Shopee 一段时间以来一直在提高卖家费用。

and also a player like Shopppee who is catering to the lower end of the market. (45:27) But we don't see price wars happening where either one of them are really significantly cutting their take rates.

And actually, Shopppee has been raising seller fees for a while now.

而我们没有看到这些。而且正如我们提到的,Shopee 正在提高卖家费用。这不是价格战中会发生的事。

(57:02) And we haven't seen those. And Shopppee, as we've mentioned, is raising seller fees. And that's not what happens in a price war.

—

再次降低门槛,而他们不会因此亏钱。而例如 Shopee,他们降低免运费门槛就必须付出代价,因为对他们来说这并不盈利,因为你还没有足够的单量。

(50:34) lower the threshold again and they don't lose money on that. Whereas Shopee, for example, they have to pay up for lowering the free shipping threshold because for them it's not profitable because you don't yet have the volume.

—

Shopee 的优势在于,如果你经营的是这些低端、低质量的商品,你会通过你的系统输送大量单量。

(50:47) advantage of Shopppee is that if you're in these lower term, lower quality goods, you send a lot of volume through your system.

—

这些相同客户身上的利润。所以 Shopee 可以在运费上与 Me 匹敌,但在信贷上要匹敌就难得多。

(51:38) the profits on those same customers. So shopppee can match me on shipping, but it's much harder to match it on credit.

观察点

Shopee在巴西的平均订单价值
随着Shopee赢得更高端的购买,平均订单价值上升
未知季度财报
支撑Shopee持续表现良好的观点

这个频道对 $SE 的历次判断

The Intrinsic Value Podcast 在这只股票上共 2 条判断,这里只列相邻的几条。

跨洋听风