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$BRK.B

$BRK.B · The Motley Fool · 2026-11-09

AI 摘要 · The Motley Fool

伯克希尔的盈利下滑主要源于保险业务:Geico 的承保利润率收窄至个位数(综合成本率从 84% 升至 91%),原因是其有意加大投入,从 Progressive 手中夺回市场份额——说话者认可这笔支出。第三季度回购 96 亿美元,年初至今超过 140 亿美元,显示 Greg Abel 正将资本配置从巴菲特 1.2 倍市净率的规则转向别处,说话者称这是一个相当看涨的信号,不过股价处于历史高位,可能已不再低于内在价值。

看涨他说的是几个月内
《A New Catalyst for Coinbase?》
The Motley Fool发布 2026-11-09 · 8 段内容
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8 段内容
0:2720:56

上周末,Berkshire Hathaway 公布了第三季度业绩。我想先从保险谈起。显然,Berkshire 是一家庞大的公司,我们不可能面面俱到,但保险是这项业务中非常大的一块。

over the weekend, Birkshshire Hathaway posting its third quarter results. And I want to start off by talking about insurance. Obviously, Birkshshire is a huge company, so we can't talk about everything, but insurance a very big component of the business.

Berkshire 的管理层多次承认了这一点,说他们失去了第二大的市场份额,State Farm 是第一,他们几年前把第二大的市场份额输给了 Progressive,他们在技术上落后了,他们的广告宣传也不如以前有效,那只壁虎过了一阵子大概也有点累了,而且他们的盈利能力一直不算太好,如果你看他们的综合成本率,即便是一年前 Geico 盈利能力很强的时候,Geico 的综合成本率大约是84%,后来升到了91%。这意味着他们的承保利润率现在只有个位数。

Berkshire's management admitted this uh several times uh saying that they lost the number two market share state farms number one they lost the number two market share a few years ago to progressive and it's they were they fell behind on technology their ad campaigns weren't as effective as they used to be you know the gecko got kind of tired after after a while I guess um but and their profitability hadn't been that great if you look at their combined ratio even a year ago when Geico is highly profitable.

Geico's combined ratio is about 84%. It went up to 91%. Meaning that their underwriting margin is now in the single digits.

但他们又开始主动出击了,这就是为什么他们的成本结构在过去一年里上升了这么多。这就是为什么他们的盈利能力不像我们希望看到的那么好。而这确实是 Berkshire 盈利下滑的最大原因。

是因为保险业务的承保,或者说保险业务的承保盈利能力,因为他们在增长上花了更多钱,作为股东,我对此没意见。我不满意的是他们那种被动落后的状态,但我对他们花钱追赶是没意见的。

but they're starting to play offense again, which that's why their cost structure went up so much over the past year. That's why they're not as profitable as we'd like to see. And that's really the biggest reason Bergkshire's earnings were down.

Uh it's because of of underwriting in or uh the underwriting profitability in insurance because they're spending more money on growth, which as a shareholder, I'm fine with that.

I'm not fi fine with them kind of passively falling behind, but I'm fine with them spending money to kind of catch up.

是的,这算是一种有意为之的承保小周期策略,单位经济效益变得稍微更有利了一些。Greg Abel 的团队决定为这种大规模的广告攻势提供资金,以努力夺回并扩大市场份额,这是他们确实需要做的事。

Yeah, I mean this is kind of a deliberate underwriting microcycle strategy where the unit economics flipped a bit more favorably. Greg Abel's team is decided to fund this kind of massive advertising spree to work on clawing back and expanding market share which is something they really need to do.

提醒一下,如果你是在 Apple 播客或任何你收听播客的地方收听,如果能关注我们,那会对这个节目有帮助。但我们想继续聊 Berkshire,聊聊回购。我想给你们俩抛出一个数据。

Berkshire 在本季度回购了96亿美元的股票。如果你看从2024年初到上个季度,累计是76亿美元,而现在我们在一个季度里就比那个数字高出20亿。当然,Warren Buffett 历史上在 Berkshire 股价低于其内在价值时都会积极买入。

那么 Rachel,这是否是一个信号,表明按照新任 CEO Greg Abel 的看法,它正以低于内在价值的价格交易?你又该如何谈论什么是内在价值?

And just as a reminder, if you're listening on Apple Apple podcast or anywhere you listen to podcast, if you could throw us a follow, that would help this show. But we want to keep talking Birkshshire and talk about the repurchases.

I want to hit you both with a stat here. So $9.6 billion in share repurchases for Birkshshire during the quarter. If you look from the start of 2024 through last quarter, 7.6 billion cumulative and now we're two billion higher than that in a single quarter.

And of course, Warren Buffett historically purchased aggressively when Birkshshire was trading under its intrinsic value. And so Rachel, is this a signal that it is trading under its intrinsic value according to new CEO Greg Ael?

And how would you even talk about what intrinsic value is?

我认为我们非常清楚地看到,在 CEO Greg Abel 的领导下,Berkshire 的资本配置策略发生了转变,我认为这是意料之中的。你看 Abel 调整 Berkshire 资本配置策略的方式。

他们第三季度回购的加速,基本上是把第二季度投入的资金翻了一倍多,如果我没算错的话,这把年初至今的回购总额推高到了140亿美元以上。而这与 Buffett 那种历史性的做法不同,对吧?

Buffett 保持了一条严格的规则,正如你所说,只有在价格安全地低于保守的内在价值估算时才回购股票,那个估算大约是1.2倍市净率,而该股目前的交易价格略高于这个水平。我认为我们看到这位新任 CEO 在以不同的方式引导公司。

我认为他在打上自己的印记和烙印。我不认为这是坏事。

I think we are very clearly seeing a shift in Birkshshire's capital allocation strategy under CEO Greg Gable and I think that was expected... You look at the way in which AEL is uh you know adjusting Birkshshire's capital allocation strategy.

This acceleration of their Q3 share rate purchases essentially more than double what was deployed in Q2 that pushes the yeartoate buyback total to uh over 14 billion if my math is right.

And I mean it differs from the sort of historic Buffett approach, right? I mean Buffett maintained kind of a strict rule as you said to only buy back shares when the price sat safely below conservative conservative intrinsic estimates which was about 1.2 two times book value and the stock trades a bit above that at this point.

I think we're seeing the new CEO uh is sort of shephering the company in a different way. I think he's putting his own mark and footprint on things. I don't think that that's a bad thing.

Rachel说得对。这正是内在价值的标准定义,但其中很大一部分非常主观,尤其是给一家拥有60多项业务的公司估值时更是如此。所以,如果你让10位金融专家说出Berkshire Hathaway的内在价值是多少,你大概率会得到10个不同的答案。

这就是这件事如此棘手的原因。Berkshire的规则——Rachel也提到了——是公司只有在管理层认为股价低于内在价值时才能回购股票。所以,我们完全不知道Greg Abel对Berkshire内在价值的估计是多少。

我们不知道这是否和Warren Buffett所用的估计一样。我们完全不知道。但很明显,他认为在第三季度的大部分时间里股价低于内在价值。这只股票刚刚创下历史新高,所以他可能不再这么认为了。

96亿美元,这是一次相当激进的回购。它占Berkshire流通股不到1%。所以,放在大背景下看。Berkshire的数字非常非常大。96亿美元,占流通股1%算是激进的回购,但这并不是我们见过的最激进的。

很多公司比这激进得多。以Berkshire的标准来说,他们在现金上非常保守。所以这是一个相当看涨的信号。

Rachel's right. uh you know that's the textbook definition of intrinsic value, but a lot of it is very subjective, especially when it comes to valuing a company that owns 60 plus businesses and things like that.

So if you ask 10 financial experts to tell you what Bergkshire Hathway's intrinsic value is, you're probably going to get 10 different answers. Uh and that's what makes this so tough.

Uh Bergkshire's rule, and Rachel mentioned this as well, is that the company can only repurchase shares when management believes the stock trades below intrinsic value. So, we have absolutely no idea what Greg Abel's estimate of Bergkshire's intrinsic value is.

We have no idea if it's the same as what Warren Buffett used. We like we have no idea. Uh but clearly, he thinks it's it was below its intrinsic value for most of the third quarter. um the the stock just hit an al an new all-time high, so he might not feel that way anymore.

Uh $9.6 billion, that's a fairly aggressive uh buyback. It represents less than 1% of Bergkshire's outstanding shares. So, put it in perspective. Bergkshire numbers are very, very big.

Uh $9.6 billion is, you know, 1% of your outstanding shares is an aggressive buyback, but it's not the most aggressive we've seen. A lot of companies are much more aggressive than that. for Berkshire standards that they're very conservative with cash.

Uh so that is a pretty bullish [music] uh bullish signal.

谈谈Berkshire的回购与周一的对比。

talk about Bergkshire's buybacks compared to Monday's.

观察点

Berkshire下一份季报中的第四季度股票回购金额
回购规模持续保持高位,接近96亿美元的节奏
下一份季报Berkshire的季度财报
支持看多回购的信号

这个频道对 $BRK.B 的历次判断

The Motley Fool 在这只股票上共 2 条判断,这里只列相邻的几条。

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