$META

$META · Joseph Carlson After Hours · 2026-11-11

AI 摘要 · Joseph Carlson After Hours

Meta 估值便宜,当前是机会,且仍在说话者的投资组合中;此次回调反映的是债务、AI 资本开支和表外会计方面的担忧,而他不认同这些担忧。这个 270 亿美元的数据中心 SPV 是公开的、在 SEC 注册并经过审计,Meta 仅出资 20%(略高于 50 亿美元),外部投资者出资 80%,且相关租约即便退出损失也很小。凭借约 800 亿美元营业利润、不存在偿付能力担忧、由 Meta 支持的项目获得 A+ 评级、评级机构已充分计入该风险敞口,他并不担心这项关键审计事项。

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Joseph Carlson After Hours发布 2026-11-11 · 18 段内容

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然后是Steve Eisman,他做了一个视频,对AI建设大加抨击。在视频里,他特别提到了Meta,并强调Meta有隐蔽的表外债务。这件事被描绘成Meta的一种小把戏。

Then we have Steve Eisman who did a video that was a big takedown on the AI buildout. In it, he addresses Meta in particular and he highlights Meta's sneaky offbalance sheet debt.

This is something that's painted as a little bit of a trick by Meta.

接下来我认为今天真正具有价值、并且仍然存在机会的另一家公司是Meta。这也是我持仓中的一只。3月下旬,Meta经历了一次大幅下跌,随后很快回升到650以上。之后股价下跌、回升、再下跌,然后又出现了一次大幅反弹。

那是在Muse发布的时候,人们对此非常热情,看起来Meta的大赌注随着Muse的快速普及开始见效了。而现在股价又跌了回去,因为投资者再次开始担心债务、AI建设、所有资本开支,以及Meta正在做的所有那些花招。

所谓花招,就是所有的债务和资本开支建设,尤其是他们对这些债务的会计处理方式,其中一部分被放在了资产负债表之外。

Now, the next one that I believe is really good value today and an opportunity remains Meta. This is another one in my portfolio. In late March, Meta went through a big dip and it quickly recovered back to above 650.

Then the stock traded down, back up, back down, and then it had a big resurgence. This is when Muse was released. People were very enthusiastic about that. It seemed like Meta's big bet was starting to pay off with the rapid adoption of Muse.

And now the stock has traded back down as investors have once again become concerned about the debt, the AI buildout, all the capex and all the funny business that Meta is doing.

And that funny business, so to speak, is all of the debt and capex buildout and especially how they're accounting for that debt. Some of it being off of their balance sheet.

我最近听了Steve Eisman做的一段关于Meta表外债务的节目。我听完这段内容,尤其是在进一步研究这个话题之后,发现自己并不认同Steve Eisman围绕Meta得出的结论和描述。

总的来说,我认为他把Meta描绘得比实际情况阴险、狡猾得多。

Now, I listened to a recent segment that Steve Eisen did on Meta talking about their offbalance sheet debt. And I found myself listening through this clip and especially researching this topic more disagreeing with the conclusions and characterization that Steve Eisman was making around meta.

In general, I believe he's painting out meta to be a lot more sinister and sneaky than they actually are.

举个例子,Meta正在使用一种表外技术来为一个数据中心融资。Meta并不是超大规模云厂商,它在开发自己的大语言模型和智能体AI应用,所以它建设数据中心是自用的。去年,Meta涉足了表外融资领域,为一个位于路易斯安那州、价值270亿美元的数据中心提供资金。

这个数据中心靠债务融资,但这笔债务不在Meta的资产负债表上。取而代之的是,设立了一个名为Beignet Investor LLC的表外特殊目的实体,也就是SPV。SPV这个词念起来很顺口。

不过这个名字值得点赞,因为在New Orleans待过的人都知道beignet真的很好吃,但这里的融资就没那么讨人喜欢了。从技术上讲,Meta只拥有Beignet 20%的股份,其余由Blue Owl和PIMCO持有。

所以,尽管Meta在建设这个数据中心,并承诺向Beignet租用该数据中心20年,还承担任何项目延期和超支的成本,这笔债务却不会出现在Meta的资产负债表上。这是一套相当花哨的操作,让人想起过去那些糟糕的时期,而且经不起推敲。

For example, Meta is using an offbalance sheet technique to fund one of its data centers. Now Meta is not a hyperscaler. It is creating its own LLMs and Aentic AI apps. So, it is building data centers for its own use.

Last year, Meta dipped its toe [music] in the world of offbalance sheet financing in order to fund a 27 billion data center in Louisiana. The data center is financed with debt, but the debt is not on Meta's balance sheet.

Instead, an offbalance sheet special purpose vehicle SPV was set up called Beignet Investor LLC. SPV rolls off the tongue. Hat tip though to the name as anyone who has spent time in New Orleans knows that bees are really delicious but the financing is less appealing.

Technically Meta owns only 20% of Beignet with the rest owned by Blue Owl and PIMCO. So even though Meta is building the data center [music] and has promised to rent the data center for Beignet for 20 years and bears the cost of any project delays and overruns the debt will not sit on Meta's balance sheet.

That's some pretty fancy footwork that's reminiscent of bad times past [music] and doesn't pass the smell test.

例如,Eisman援引Enron作为例子,借此引出大型科技公司、特别是Meta正在做的事情。每当人们想到Enron,就会想到欺诈、欺骗、撒谎和耍花招。这对Meta并不公平。Meta所做的完全不同。

首先,Meta所做的一切都是光明正大的,全部完全公开。他们在做任何事之前,都把一切交给了所有相关方、所有审计师、所有人。他们甚至在动手之前就把这一切向SEC和所有委员会做了登记。

所以从一开始,Meta就没有试图隐瞒任何东西。这里没有欺骗,也没有欺诈。

For example, Eisman invokes Enron as the the example kind of leading into what big tech and specifically Meta is doing. Anytime someone thinks of Enron, they think of fraud, deception, lying, and trickery.

That's not really fair to Meta. What Meta has done is completely different. First of all, everything that Meta has done is above board. All of it is completely public. They've handed everything over to all the appropriate uh parties, all the auditors, everybody before they've done anything.

They even registered all of this with the SEC and all the commissions before doing anything. So, right off the bat, Meta is not trying to hide anything. There's no deception here. There's no fraud going on.

再看看特殊目的实体,也就是他在这里具体谈的东西,Enron设立SPV的原因,恰恰是为了隐藏那些毫无价值、并且正在迅速贬值的有毒资产。而Meta融资的是极具生产力的资产,价值连城。

这些是GPU和数据中心,它们在为现代美国提供算力,在为现代文明提供算力。Enron当时试图隐藏的很多东西都完全资不抵债,根本赚不到钱。

When you look at also the special purpose vehicle, which is specifically what what he's talking about here, the reason that Enron did the SPVS was specifically to hide toxic assets that had no value and were quickly losing value.

Meta is financing extremely productive assets that are worth a fortune. These are GPUs and data centers that are computing modern America. This is modern civilization that these are computing.

Many of the things that Enron was trying to hide were completely underwater. They weren't making money at all.

另一个小区别是,Enron的营业收入不到20亿美元,而Meta的营业收入大约在800亿美元这个量级。两者的经济实力完全不在一个层次。Meta实际上就是世界上盈利能力最强的企业之一。

它几乎没有,而且我个人会说根本没有,出现偿付能力问题的可能。

Another small difference is Enron had operating income of less than $2 billion. Meta's operating income is in the range of like $80 billion. They're not even close to each other and their economic power.

Like Meta is literally one of the most profitable businesses in the world. They have very little and I would say personally no chance of solveny issues.

这就是为什么即便是债权人在审视这件事时,也会看着它说,这个项目实际上获得了S&P Global的A+评级。他们会彻底审视它,审视与之相关的风险。为什么这个项目能拿到A+评级?因为背后是Meta在支撑,而Meta拥有极其强大的财务结构。

That's why even when the creditors are looking at this, they're looking at this and saying this project actually has an A+ rating by S&P Global. looking at it thoroughly, looking at the risk associated with it.

Why do they have an A+ rating on this project? Because Meta is the one backing it. And Meta has an incredibly strong financial structure.

我认为另一处不公平的描述,是270亿美元这个数字在这段节目里被反复提及。这里有一篇新闻文章,写的也是270亿美元。这没错,整个项目是270亿美元,但请记住,Meta只出资其中的20%。

所以他们实际投入的只有50多亿美元,建设数据中心的其余80%由外部投资者出资。所以Meta并没有为这些数据中心的全部建设买单,Meta只为50亿美元、也就是20%的所有权付钱。

他们从其他投资者那里获得外部融资,而这些投资者都是资本非常雄厚的投资者。所以这些外部参与者都是重量级选手,不是小投资者。他们出资那80%,然后把数据中心租给Meta。

Another thing that I think is an unfair characterization is how this number $27 billion is repeated throughout this segment. We have a news article here with it at $27 billion.

And that's true. The whole project is $27 billion, but remember Meta is only funding 20% of this. So what they're actually putting up is just over $5 billion. the outside investors that are building the data centers are funding the other 80% of it.

So Meta is not paying for all the construction of these data centers. Meta is just paying for $5 billion or 20% ownership. They get outside funding from other investors that are very well capitalized investors.

So the people that are outside of this are heavyweights. These aren't small-time investors. They're funding the 80% and then they're going to lease it out to Meta.

这笔项目之所以不在 Meta 的资产负债表上,是因为 Meta 只出资 20%,而且他们并不控制这个项目。做决定的不是他们,而是他们租用设施的那一方。所以,他们签的是租赁合同,这也给了 Meta 灵活性。

举例来说,如果 Meta 自己出资建设这个项目,他们就得拿出 50 亿美元以上,然后还要承担租用四年的义务。也就是说,他们必须租这么久。而 Meta 可以以极小的损失放弃这份租约。

如果他们愿意,完全可以彻底退出,把这一切留给建设了整个项目的投资者,也就是那 80%。所以整体来看,这也不算很大的承诺。他们找到了一种办法,在建设 Beignet 这个庞大项目时,不必在财务上让自己承担太多风险,其余部分由 Blue Owl 和 Pimco 持有。

所以,尽管 Meta 正在建设这个数据中心,并承诺为 Benet 租用该数据中心 20 年,还承担任何项目延期和超支的成本,但这笔债务不会落在 Meta 的资产负债表上。

The reason that this sits off the balance sheet of Meta is because Meta is funding 20% and they don't have control over the project. They're not the ones deciding everything. That's the people they're renting from.

So, they have a contract to lease, which also gives Meta flexibility. For example, if Meta funded this project, they'd put up $5 billion plus and then they have the obligation to lease it for four years.

So, that's how much they have to lease it. Meta could abandon the lease with minimal damage. They could completely exit this if they want and leave that to the investors that built the whole thing, the 80%.

So this also is not that big of a commitment in whole. So they've also found a way to not expose themselves that much financially to constructing this massive project of Beignet with the rest owned by Blue Owl and Pimco.

So even though Meta is building the data center and has promised to rent the data center for Benet for 20 years and bears the cost of any project delays and overruns the debt will not sit on Meta's balance sheet.

Meta 正在建设这个数据中心的 20%,其余 80% 由外部投资者出资。也许是记着 Arthur Anderson 的遭遇,Ernston Young 与他的审计师会面,而这位审计师对 Benet 这个表外金融工程的杰作并不完全放心。

在 Meta 的 2025 年 10-K 中,Ernson Young 将其标记为“关键审计事项”。

Meta is building 20% of the data center. They're being financed 80% from outside investors. Perhaps with the memory of what happened to Arthur Anderson in mind, Ernston Young met his auditor who was not totally comfortable with this Benet masterpiece of offbalance sheet financial engineering.

In Meta's 202510K, Ernson Young flagged it as a quote critical audit matter [music] unquote.

现在,我不打算引用 10-K 里的那一段,因为它相当长、很无聊,而且是用刻意让人看不明白的会计语言写的。我要做的是把那种语言翻译成大白话,或者至少翻译成我认为他们真正想表达的意思。

我们 Ernston Young 对这笔交易非常紧张。我们完全不确定它是否应该放在表外。我们依赖了公司对这笔交易的描述,但我们并没有自己做任何实质性的工作来判断 Meta 对这笔交易的说明是否真的准确。

毕竟,我们是要拿钱的,而 Meta 是个大客户。这就是我对这段会计语言的解读。

Now, I'm not going to quote the section from the 10K because it is quite long, boring, and written in accounting language designed to obfiscate. What I'm going to do is translate that language into plain English or at least the English that I think is what they're really saying.

We at Ernston Young are very nervous about this transaction. We are really not sure at all whether this should be off balance sheet. [music] We relied on the company's description of the transaction, but we did not do any real work of our own to determine whether that what Meta said about the transaction is really accurate.

After all, we want to get paid and Meta is a big [music] client. That's my slant on the accounting language.

所以,他对这件事的解读基本上是:Ernest and Young 把这标记为关键事项,他们并没有深入调查,而是说:“我们会相信 Meta 以及他们对这笔交易的描述,因为 Meta 是个大客户。”这是非常愤世嫉俗的看法。

So, his slant on this is basically Ernest and Young labeled this as a critical matter. They didn't look into it and they said, "We're going to trust Meta and their description of this because Meta is a big client." It's a very cynical take on this.

现在我意识到,Steve Eisman 是一位非常资深的分析师,对吧?他在金融界待了很长时间。他很有公信力,也有名望和声誉。而我在这里只是个普通人。我不是资深分析师,也不是会计师。

我没有做过法务财务会计之类的工作。但我就是不同意这种定性。我认为,如果你只看数据,就看数据,不是因为它出自我或别人之口,就看这里的实际信息。我认为其中很多内容与那种说法不符。

And now I realize that Steve Eisman is a very senior analyst, right? He's been in the financial world for a long period of time. He has a lot of credibility and name and reputation along with that.

And I'm here just a mere mort mortal. I'm not a senior analyst, accountant. I haven't done forensic financial accounting or anything like that. But I I just don't agree again with this characterization.

And I think the data, if you just look at the data, look at the data, not that it's coming from me or anyone else, just look at the actual information here. And I think a lot of it disagrees with that.

我对这一点的意见是,我认为它给人一种印象,好像 Meta 不知怎么蒙骗或欺骗了 S&P Global 和 Moody's 这样的信用评级机构,好像他们根本没有看这些特殊目的实体,根本没有看这些表外项目。

但事实并非如此。他们根本没有被骗。他们在对 Meta 信用评级的整体评估中考虑了这一点。也就是说,S&P Global 和 Moody's 在评估信用评级时,都充分计入了所有表外项目及其相关敞口。

这笔交易的每一个细节都是已知的。全部都是光明正大的。他们审视了其中的每一个方面。所以,我认为说他们在欺骗信用评级机构,并不是正确的描述。

My issue with this is I think it gives the impression that Meta somehow hoodwinkedked or tricked the credit rating agencies like S&P Global and Moody's that somehow they're just not looking at these special purpose vehicles that they're not looking at all at these offbalance sheet items.

And that's not the case. They haven't tricked them at all. They are looking at this as part of their overall assessment in Meta's credit rating. Meaning both S&P Global and Moody's are fully factoring in all the off-balance sheet items and exposure to them in their assessment of their credit rating.

Every single detail of the deal is known. All of it is above board. They've looked over every single aspect of it. So, I don't think it's the correct picture to paint that they're tricking the credit rating agencies.

另一部分是,他把 Ernest & Young 说成是把这件事标记为关键审计事项,然后说:“啊,我们知道这很重要,但我们就相信 Meta,因为它是大客户。”可是,像 Ernest and Young 这样的审计师把事项标记为关键审计事项,并不是为了少看它。

当你把某件事标记为关键审计事项时,通常意味着要更多地审视它,让更高级别的管理层来看,让更有经验的审计师和更大的团队来看这个具体问题。这是为了给该问题带来更多审查和关注,而不是更少。

所以,他们审视了这笔交易的每一个细节、每一份合同、所有文件。他们按照审计师应有的方式仔细过了一遍。你不必相信我的话。你只要打开 10-K,看看“我们在审计中如何处理该事项”。他们详细说明了他们基本上是如何审视每一个方面的。

The other part is he characterizes Ernest & Young as labeling this as a critical audit matter and then saying, "Ah, we know this is important, but we're just going to trust Meta because they're a big customer."

Well, auditors like Ernest and Young don't label things critical audit matters to look at them less. When you label something a critical audit matter, that usually entails looking at it more, having more senior management look at it, having more experienced auditors and bigger teams look at that specific issue.

It's to draw more scrutiny and light on the issue, not less. And so, they have looked at every single detail of this deal, every contract, all the paperwork. They've gone over it as an auditor should.

And you don't have to trust my word on this. You can just open up the 10K and look at it. How we addressed the matter in our audit. They go through in detail how they basically looked at every aspect of this.

顺便说一句,任何上市公司的 10-K 平均有 1.7 个关键审计事项。也就是说,几乎每家公司都至少有一个。有些公司有两个。大约 70% 的上市公司在 10-K 中至少有一个被监管机构强调的关键审计事项。

所以,一家公司有关键审计事项并不罕见。实际上,没有关键审计事项才罕见。那反而可能比 Meta 在 10-K 中有这一个关键审计事项更能亮起红灯。

And by the way, the average 10K for any publicly traded company has on average 1.7 critical audit matters. Meaning almost every company has at least one. Some of them have two.

And around 70% of publicly traded companies have at least one critical audit matter highlighted by regulators in their 10K. So, it's not unusual for a company to have a CAM, a critical audit matter.

It's actually unusual for them to not have one. That would actually potentially raise more red flags than if Meta has this one in their 10K.

所以我个人完全不担心这件事。我认为这根本不值得担忧。事实上,我越是研究这个话题、查看他们的表外项目、这些 SPV,我就越不担心。这并不是一个让你发现 Meta 在秘密行事、试图隐藏东西的兔子洞。

所有这些都明明白白地摆在眼前。全部都是光明正大的。信用评级机构和审计师都清楚。而 Meta 有足够的财务实力来覆盖它。

So, I'm personally just not worried about this at all. I don't think it's a concern in the slightest. In fact, the more that I research this topic and look at their offbalance sheet items, these SPVS, the less concern that I get.

It's not a rabbit hole where you discover that Meta is doing things under secrecy and they're trying to hide things. All of this is plainly in sight. All of it is above board. It's all known by the credit rating agencies and the auditors.

And Meta has more than enough financial power to be able to cover it.

这个频道对 $META 的历次判断

Joseph Carlson After Hours 在这只股票上共 11 条判断,这里只列相邻的几条。

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