Joseph Carlson After Hours on $META (Nov 11, 2026)
Meta is good value and an opportunity today and remains in the speaker's portfolio; the pullback reflects debt, AI capex and off-balance-sheet accounting fears that he rejects. The $27 billion data-center SPV is public, SEC-registered and audited, with Meta funding only 20% (just over $5 billion), outside investors 80%, and a lease it could exit with minimal damage. With roughly $80 billion operating income, no solvency worry, an A+ project rating backed by Meta and agencies fully factoring the exposure, he is not concerned by the critical audit matter.
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Then we have Steve Eisman who did a video that was a big takedown on the AI buildout. In it, he addresses Meta in particular and he highlights Meta's sneaky offbalance sheet debt.
This is something that's painted as a little bit of a trick by Meta.
Now, the next one that I believe is really good value today and an opportunity remains Meta. This is another one in my portfolio. In late March, Meta went through a big dip and it quickly recovered back to above 650.
Then the stock traded down, back up, back down, and then it had a big resurgence. This is when Muse was released. People were very enthusiastic about that. It seemed like Meta's big bet was starting to pay off with the rapid adoption of Muse.
And now the stock has traded back down as investors have once again become concerned about the debt, the AI buildout, all the capex and all the funny business that Meta is doing.
And that funny business, so to speak, is all of the debt and capex buildout and especially how they're accounting for that debt. Some of it being off of their balance sheet.
Now, I listened to a recent segment that Steve Eisen did on Meta talking about their offbalance sheet debt. And I found myself listening through this clip and especially researching this topic more disagreeing with the conclusions and characterization that Steve Eisman was making around meta.
In general, I believe he's painting out meta to be a lot more sinister and sneaky than they actually are.
For example, Meta is using an offbalance sheet technique to fund one of its data centers. Now Meta is not a hyperscaler. It is creating its own LLMs and Aentic AI apps. So, it is building data centers for its own use.
Last year, Meta dipped its toe [music] in the world of offbalance sheet financing in order to fund a 27 billion data center in Louisiana. The data center is financed with debt, but the debt is not on Meta's balance sheet.
Instead, an offbalance sheet special purpose vehicle SPV was set up called Beignet Investor LLC. SPV rolls off the tongue. Hat tip though to the name as anyone who has spent time in New Orleans knows that bees are really delicious but the financing is less appealing.
Technically Meta owns only 20% of Beignet with the rest owned by Blue Owl and PIMCO. So even though Meta is building the data center [music] and has promised to rent the data center for Beignet for 20 years and bears the cost of any project delays and overruns the debt will not sit on Meta's balance sheet.
That's some pretty fancy footwork that's reminiscent of bad times past [music] and doesn't pass the smell test.
For example, Eisman invokes Enron as the the example kind of leading into what big tech and specifically Meta is doing. Anytime someone thinks of Enron, they think of fraud, deception, lying, and trickery.
That's not really fair to Meta. What Meta has done is completely different. First of all, everything that Meta has done is above board. All of it is completely public. They've handed everything over to all the appropriate uh parties, all the auditors, everybody before they've done anything.
They even registered all of this with the SEC and all the commissions before doing anything. So, right off the bat, Meta is not trying to hide anything. There's no deception here. There's no fraud going on.
When you look at also the special purpose vehicle, which is specifically what what he's talking about here, the reason that Enron did the SPVS was specifically to hide toxic assets that had no value and were quickly losing value.
Meta is financing extremely productive assets that are worth a fortune. These are GPUs and data centers that are computing modern America. This is modern civilization that these are computing.
Many of the things that Enron was trying to hide were completely underwater. They weren't making money at all.
Another small difference is Enron had operating income of less than $2 billion. Meta's operating income is in the range of like $80 billion. They're not even close to each other and their economic power.
Like Meta is literally one of the most profitable businesses in the world. They have very little and I would say personally no chance of solveny issues.
That's why even when the creditors are looking at this, they're looking at this and saying this project actually has an A+ rating by S&P Global. looking at it thoroughly, looking at the risk associated with it.
Why do they have an A+ rating on this project? Because Meta is the one backing it. And Meta has an incredibly strong financial structure.
Another thing that I think is an unfair characterization is how this number $27 billion is repeated throughout this segment. We have a news article here with it at $27 billion.
And that's true. The whole project is $27 billion, but remember Meta is only funding 20% of this. So what they're actually putting up is just over $5 billion. the outside investors that are building the data centers are funding the other 80% of it.
So Meta is not paying for all the construction of these data centers. Meta is just paying for $5 billion or 20% ownership. They get outside funding from other investors that are very well capitalized investors.
So the people that are outside of this are heavyweights. These aren't small-time investors. They're funding the 80% and then they're going to lease it out to Meta.
The reason that this sits off the balance sheet of Meta is because Meta is funding 20% and they don't have control over the project. They're not the ones deciding everything. That's the people they're renting from.
So, they have a contract to lease, which also gives Meta flexibility. For example, if Meta funded this project, they'd put up $5 billion plus and then they have the obligation to lease it for four years.
So, that's how much they have to lease it. Meta could abandon the lease with minimal damage. They could completely exit this if they want and leave that to the investors that built the whole thing, the 80%.
So this also is not that big of a commitment in whole. So they've also found a way to not expose themselves that much financially to constructing this massive project of Beignet with the rest owned by Blue Owl and Pimco.
So even though Meta is building the data center and has promised to rent the data center for Benet for 20 years and bears the cost of any project delays and overruns the debt will not sit on Meta's balance sheet.
Meta is building 20% of the data center. They're being financed 80% from outside investors. Perhaps with the memory of what happened to Arthur Anderson in mind, Ernston Young met his auditor who was not totally comfortable with this Benet masterpiece of offbalance sheet financial engineering.
In Meta's 202510K, Ernson Young flagged it as a quote critical audit matter [music] unquote.
Now, I'm not going to quote the section from the 10K because it is quite long, boring, and written in accounting language designed to obfiscate. What I'm going to do is translate that language into plain English or at least the English that I think is what they're really saying.
We at Ernston Young are very nervous about this transaction. We are really not sure at all whether this should be off balance sheet. [music] We relied on the company's description of the transaction, but we did not do any real work of our own to determine whether that what Meta said about the transaction is really accurate.
After all, we want to get paid and Meta is a big [music] client. That's my slant on the accounting language.
So, his slant on this is basically Ernest and Young labeled this as a critical matter. They didn't look into it and they said, "We're going to trust Meta and their description of this because Meta is a big client." It's a very cynical take on this.
And now I realize that Steve Eisman is a very senior analyst, right? He's been in the financial world for a long period of time. He has a lot of credibility and name and reputation along with that.
And I'm here just a mere mort mortal. I'm not a senior analyst, accountant. I haven't done forensic financial accounting or anything like that. But I I just don't agree again with this characterization.
And I think the data, if you just look at the data, look at the data, not that it's coming from me or anyone else, just look at the actual information here. And I think a lot of it disagrees with that.
My issue with this is I think it gives the impression that Meta somehow hoodwinkedked or tricked the credit rating agencies like S&P Global and Moody's that somehow they're just not looking at these special purpose vehicles that they're not looking at all at these offbalance sheet items.
And that's not the case. They haven't tricked them at all. They are looking at this as part of their overall assessment in Meta's credit rating. Meaning both S&P Global and Moody's are fully factoring in all the off-balance sheet items and exposure to them in their assessment of their credit rating.
Every single detail of the deal is known. All of it is above board. They've looked over every single aspect of it. So, I don't think it's the correct picture to paint that they're tricking the credit rating agencies.
The other part is he characterizes Ernest & Young as labeling this as a critical audit matter and then saying, "Ah, we know this is important, but we're just going to trust Meta because they're a big customer."
Well, auditors like Ernest and Young don't label things critical audit matters to look at them less. When you label something a critical audit matter, that usually entails looking at it more, having more senior management look at it, having more experienced auditors and bigger teams look at that specific issue.
It's to draw more scrutiny and light on the issue, not less. And so, they have looked at every single detail of this deal, every contract, all the paperwork. They've gone over it as an auditor should.
And you don't have to trust my word on this. You can just open up the 10K and look at it. How we addressed the matter in our audit. They go through in detail how they basically looked at every aspect of this.
And by the way, the average 10K for any publicly traded company has on average 1.7 critical audit matters. Meaning almost every company has at least one. Some of them have two.
And around 70% of publicly traded companies have at least one critical audit matter highlighted by regulators in their 10K. So, it's not unusual for a company to have a CAM, a critical audit matter.
It's actually unusual for them to not have one. That would actually potentially raise more red flags than if Meta has this one in their 10K.
So, I'm personally just not worried about this at all. I don't think it's a concern in the slightest. In fact, the more that I research this topic and look at their offbalance sheet items, these SPVS, the less concern that I get.
It's not a rabbit hole where you discover that Meta is doing things under secrecy and they're trying to hide things. All of this is plainly in sight. All of it is above board. It's all known by the credit rating agencies and the auditors.
And Meta has more than enough financial power to be able to cover it.
What this channel has said about $META
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